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“[L]awyers . . . want clear rules to follow. Into the resulting vacuum 
of silence about lawyers’ aspirational ideals has rushed the only 
consistent ideal left: the ethic of unswerving zeal and loyalty to cli-
ents.”1
“I have a duty to represent my client zealously.”  
—Testimony of convicted business attorney Joseph Collins.2
 Convicted attorney Joseph Collins’ client is an empty shell today. 
Collins and his law firm helped Refco, Inc.’s executives conceal hun-
dreds of millions of dollars in uncollectable debt.3 Without the stag-
gering debt on its books, the client was able to satisfy its lenders and 
raise millions of dollars from investors.4 But only weeks after Refco’s 
initial public offering, the company announced discovery of the hid-
den debt and admitted that its financial statements could not be re-
lied upon.5 Within a week of that announcement, the company filed 
for bankruptcy.6
 A malpractice suit filed by the appointed litigation trustee follow-
ing Refco’s bankruptcy highlights an issue considered in this Article7:
Did Collins harm his own client? Collins helped perpetrate a fraud 
for which the client, but for its destruction, would have faced sub-
stantial liability. Despite any short-term benefits, it seems obvious 
that the company was damaged.  
 Based on his testimony at the criminal trial, Collins did not be-
lieve he was harming his client, or anyone else for that matter.8
Collins and his firm prepared documents for seventeen “round-trip” 
loans at a Refco executive’s direction,9 without asking or understand-
ing the purpose of the transactions.10 Collins, again at management’s 
direction, made technical arguments for withholding certain docu-
ments from a purchaser during due diligence; the documents would 
have revealed the company’s staggering debt.11 By his conduct, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 1. Robert W. Gordon, The Citizen Lawyer—A Brief Informal History of a Myth with 
Some Basis in Reality, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1169, 1198 (2009) [hereinafter Gordon, 
Citizen Lawyer].
 2. See Trial Transcript at 4497, United States v. Collins, No. S1 07 Cr. 1170 (RPP) 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (cited transcript excerpts on file with author); see infra note 129 and 
accompanying text (describing Collins’ conviction).  
 3. In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 609 F. Supp. 2d 304, 306-07 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 4. See id. at 307-08. 
 5. Id. at 308 n.7. 
 6. Id.
 7. See Complaint at 107-12, Kirschner v. Grant Thornton LLP, No. 07 Civ. 11604 
(Cook Cnty. Ct. Sept. 19, 2007) (alleging claims on behalf of three Refco entities against 
Collins’ firm Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw, LLP for malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, 
aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting fraud).  
 8. See, e.g., Trial Transcript, supra note 2, at 3494.   
 9. In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 609 F. Supp. 2d 304, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 10. See, e.g., Trial Transcript, supra note 2, at 3494. 
 11. See, e.g., id. at 3494-95.   
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Collins participated in a fraud. But he claims that he would not have 
continued the representation if he had known that the conduct  
was fraudulent.12
 In this Article I argue that this style of lawyering bears the hall-
marks of zealous advocacy, that it is particularly harmful to business 
clients, and that the Bar contributes to the problem by not articulat-
ing a viable alternative. Although Collins and other business lawyers 
discussed in this Article also injured third parties, my focus is on the 
harm they caused their own clients. My position is contrary to the 
more common conception of Refco and similar cases—that the busi-
ness lawyer was too loyal to the client.13 I argue that these lawyers 
were not loyal enough.  
 I present my argument in the first three parts. In Part I, I discuss 
the American lawyer’s conception of self as zealous advocate and the 
belief that zealous advocacy is loyal to the client. In Part II, I explore 
the connection between business lawyer zealous advocacy and injury 
to the lawyer’s own client. My discussion considers both individual 
clients engaged in business and business entity clients. Then in Part 
III, I explain the incomplete and often confusing messages found in 
professional conduct rules about the business advisor’s role and how 
these failings contribute to attorneys turning to zealous advocacy.  
 In the remaining Parts, I explore fiduciary duty as a preferable 
touchstone for the profession and a superior guide for the Bar to ex-
plain the advisor’s role. While it is true lawyers are already fiduciar-
ies, fiduciary duty is not the focus for most lawyers. In Part IV, I ex-
plain why it should be, considering both the advantages and chal-
lenges of this approach. Thereafter, in Part V, using fiduciary duty as 
a framework, I propose revisions to several professional conduct rules 
that address the advisor’s role. I explain why each change contributes 
to a new touchstone for the business lawyer that is more consistent 
with the client’s interests.  
I.???THE ZEALOUS ADVOCACY MANTRA
 In the United States, lawyers, commentators, and courts under-
stand “zealous advocacy” to be the lawyer’s highest duty14 and believe 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 12. See, e.g., id. at 3617. 
13. See Chad Bray, Refco Lawyer Gets 7-Year Sentence, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2010, at 
C6 (quoting U.S. District Court Judge Robert P. Paterson who stated at Collins’ 
sentencing, “I think this is a case of excessive loyalty to his client”), available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704363504575003200481973346.html. 
 14. See Bruce A. Green, Zealous Representation Bound: The Intersection of the Ethical 
Codes and the Criminal Law, 69 N.C. L. REV. 687, 687-88 nn.1-2 (1991) (citing multiple 
authorities for the proposition that attorneys have an ethical duty to represent their clients 
“zealously” while proceeding within the bounds of the law); Sylvia Stevens, Whither Zeal? 
Defining ‘Zealous Representation’, OR. ST. B. BULL., July 2005, at 27, 27 (“I suspect, if asked 
to describe in one word the primary responsibility of lawyers, most of us would say it is 
254 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:251 
it to be synonymous with client loyalty.15 Zealous advocacy has been 
described as the narrative that conveys the ideal of the American le-
gal profession: to be a champion of “a client threatened with loss of 
life and liberty.”16 The complaint that is most frequently lodged 
against zealous advocacy is not that it harms the lawyer’s own client, 
but that lawyers use zealous advocacy as an excuse  
for incivility.17
 Since 1908, U.S. attorney conduct rules have described the only 
limit on an attorney’s zealous advocacy as “the bounds of the law.”18
Attorneys have interpreted this limitation as meaning that they 
must avoid black letter violations of law or attorney conduct rules, 
but they should otherwise vigorously pursue their clients’ goals 
through any arguably legal means.19
 Zealous advocacy is understood to require the attorney to be a par-
tisan of the client, even to the detriment of others. Henry Brougham, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
zealousness.”); see also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2556 (2009) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing criminal defense counsel’s duty to be a  
zealous advocate).  
 15. See United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 2009) (Convicted attorney 
argued that her conduct—which included filing false affirmations—was undertaken not 
with criminal intent but in an effort to zealously represent her client’s interests.).  
 16. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1243 
(1991) [hereinafter Hazard, Future].
 17. See, e.g., John Conlon, It’s Time to Get Rid of the ‘Z’ Words, RES GESTAE, Feb. 
2001, at 50, 50 (arguing that zealous advocacy is not viewed as an ethical responsibility, 
but as an excuse for rude and offensive behavior at depositions and in courtrooms).  
 18. CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 15 (1908) (explaining the lawyer’s zeal in 
pursuing the client’s interests extends “to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld 
from [the client], save by the rules of law” (emphasis added)); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980) (titled “A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously 
Within the Bounds of the Law”); id. at EC 7-1 (“The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and 
to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law . . . .” 
(footnotes omitted)); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 9 (2009) (providing that 
when different interests conflict and the Model Rules do not provide an answer, a lawyer 
should be guided by the “obligation zealously to protect and pursue a client’s legitimate 
interests, within the bounds of the law”), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/preamble.html; see also infra notes 27-29 and 
accompanying text (discussing other references to zeal in the Model Rules).  
 19. Anita Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1165, 1166 (2006) (“Zeal, 
from the start accompanied by its prissy tag-along caution ‘within . . . the bounds of the 
law,’ joined an expansive vision of what it meant to be a good lawyer.” (footnote and 
citation omitted)); Monroe H. Freedman, In Praise of Overzealous Representation—Lying to 
Judges, Deceiving Third Parties, and Other Ethical Conduct, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 771, 774 
(2006); Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron,
35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1194 (2003) [hereinafter Gordon, New Role] (asserting that the 
corporate lawyer views himself as an advocate whose job it is “to help [clients] pursue their 
interests and put the best construction on their conduct that the law and facts will support 
. . . , so as to enable them to pursue any arguably-legal ends by any arguably-legal means”); 
Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1014 (2005) [hereinafter Kim, Banality of Fraud] (describing the 
traditional conception of lawyering as zealous advocacy focused on aggressive and single-
minded pursuit of client goals not only “within, but all the way up to, the limits of  
the law”).  
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the father of zealous advocacy by most accounts, described it as the 
route “[t]o save that client” even though it might cause “the alarm, 
the torments, [and] the destruction” of others.20 Modern proponents of 
zealous advocacy have a similar regard for the concept—a zealous 
advocate is committed to partisanship.21 Practicing attorneys and 
commentators envision zealous advocacy as essential to a client-
centered representation.22
 Another popular conception of zealous advocacy is that it obligates 
an attorney to suspend personal morality in favor of zealously pursu-
ing the client’s agenda.23 Adherents to this view believe that lawyers 
must act with unmitigated zeal on behalf of their clients regardless of 
any personal moral issues with the client’s aims.24 As Professor Mi-
chael Hatfield puts it, “Beginning in law school . . . . [w]e are taught 
to accept a division between lawyers’ morality and clients’ morality, 
and the primary principle of zealous advocacy. . . .”25 This has been 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 20. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 54-55 (1988). In the 
Trial of Queen Caroline, Henry Brougham described zealous advocacy in the House of 
Lords:  
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the 
world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and 
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them, 
to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not 
regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon 
others. Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on 
reckless of consequences, though it should be his unhappy fate to involve his 
country in confusion. 
Id.; see also GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 150 (1978).  
 21. MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 71 (3d 
ed. 2004) (“The ethic of zeal is . . . pervasive in lawyers’ professional responsibilities 
because it informs all of the lawyer’s other ethical obligations with entire devotion to the 
interest of the client.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 72 (describing a zealous 
advocate as a partisan); Hazard, Future, supra note 16, at 1244 (explaining that the 
zealous advocacy narrative “pictures the lawyer as a partisan agent”).  
 22. Katherine S. Broderick, Understanding Lawyers’ Ethics: Zealous Advocacy in a 
Time of Uncertainty, 8 D.C. L. REV. 219, 220 (2004).  
 23. W. Bradley Wendel, Lawyers and Butlers: The Remains of Amoral Ethics, 9 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 161, 161 (1995) [hereinafter Wendel, Butlers] (“The notion that one 
should feel no shame or regret on one’s own account [when our clients require us to do 
distasteful things] is the principle of nonaccountability, also known as the amoral role of 
professionals.”); see also id. at 165 (citing DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS & JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL
STUDY xix-xxi (1988)) (asserting that the dominant picture of legal ethics is that lawyers 
may be required to do things that seem immoral).  
 24. Sharon Dolovich, Ethical Lawyering and the Possibility of Integrity, 70 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1629, 1629 (2002). 
 25. Michael Hatfield, Professionalizing Moral Deference, 104 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 1, 4-5 (2009). Professor Suchman asserts that a majority of litigators 
interviewed saw themselves as passive “agent[s] of their client’s will” and that they passed 
moral responsibility along to the client. Mark C. Suchman, Working Without a Net: The 
Sociology of Legal Ethics in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 867 (1998); see 
also ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
LARGE LAW FIRM 276-89 (1988) (asserting that partners at large law firms have a financial 
incentive not to “check” their clients’ desires, but rather to act as agents of their clients); 
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described as “role morality”: a lawyer’s role requires zealous advocacy 
while universal moral principles might require  
something else. 26
 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) do not 
provide a clear answer about whether business advisors should be 
guided by zealous advocacy. The preamble to the Model Rules refers 
generally to a lawyer’s duty “zealously” to protect and pursue the cli-
ent’s interests within the bounds of the law; this description is not 
limited to litigators.27 Other provisions of the preamble seem to de-
scribe litigators when referencing zealous advocacy.28 A comment to 
the diligence Model Rule states that a lawyer should act with “zeal in 
advocacy on the client’s behalf.”29
 Despite debate about whether nonlitigators should act as “zealous 
advocates,”30 there is reason to believe that many do. Business law-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Wendel, Butlers, supra note 23, at 165 (citing Scott Turow’s description of lawyers and 
morality in the book One L: “A lawyer may do his job very well, but he does not set the 
moral agenda. The ends are established by the client . . . . It is the lawyer’s obligation to 
carry those goals forward, within the limits of law . . . .” SCOTT TUROW, ONE L 309 (1988)).  
 26. See Wendel, Butlers, supra note 23, at 163-64. 
 27. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 9 (2009), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/preamble.html; id. at R. 1.3 cmt. (The diligence rule’s 
comments do not distinguish between litigators and nonlitigators.). 
 28. Paragraph 8 of the Preamble provides that when both sides are well represented, 
“a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client and . . . assume that justice is 
being done.” Id. at pmbl. ¶ 8. Paragraph 2 of the Preamble notes that lawyers play roles of 
advisor, advocate, negotiator, and evaluator, and describes that the advocate’s role is to 
“zealously assert[] the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.” Id. at
pmbl. ¶ 2. Here, the Preamble provides that the advisor “provides a client with an informed 
understanding of the client’s legal rights and obligations and explains their practical 
implications.” Id.
 29. Id. at R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (“A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to 
the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”).  
 30. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 19, at 1193 (“[C]ommentators have divided on the 
question of whether, or to what extent, zeal applies to lawyers outside the context of 
litigation and similar settings where the client faces an adversary.”); FREEDMAN & SMITH,
supra note 21, at 72 (arguing that when counseling clients, the partisanship of a zealous 
advocate is achieved by keeping in mind a potential future adversary and that the lawyer 
should give advice that will strengthen the client’s position against that future adversary); 
Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 327, 359 & 
n.144 (1998) [hereinafter Green, Criminal Regulation] (asserting many nonlitigators 
undoubtedly believe that they should be agnostic about the truth of the client’s account and 
that this view derives from “the obligations of loyalty, confidentiality and zealous 
representation” which are “not limited to courtroom lawyers”); Hazard, Future, supra note 
16, at 1244-45 (asserting that in practice lawyers’ clients are more likely to be businesses 
than individuals and the client’s matter is more likely to be a civil or regulatory 
“transaction or proceeding” rather than a criminal matter, but nonetheless, the 
partisanship principle of zealous advocacy “remains at the core of the profession’s soul”); 
Brent J. Horton, How Corporate Lawyers Escaped Sarbanes-Oxley: Disparate Treatment in 
the Legislative Process, 60 S.C. L. REV. 149, 157 (2008) (“Every lawyer works at the behest 
of his client, and the client is entitled to zealous representation—the most aggressive 
business structure that the law supports.”); Stevens, supra note 14, at 27 (“[I]t is not clear 
how zealousness applies in so-called nonadversarial situations, such as office advice and 
transactional work.”); Christopher J. Whelan, Some Realism About Professionalism: Core 
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yer anecdotes reflect that they embrace the view of self as zealous 
advocate.31 Recent cases provide examples consistent with corporate 
lawyers acting as zealous advocates.32 The zealous-advocacy mindset 
is not without consequence. There is scientific support for the propo-
sition that a lawyer’s view of his or her role impacts the advice pro-
vided to clients.33 Professor Sung Hui Kim notes the Bar’s “tremen-
dous longstanding” support of zealous advocacy as a role ideology and 
explains that zealous advocacy strengthens the business lawyer’s 
alignment with the managers of a business entity client.34 Professor 
Kim concludes that business lawyers’ identification as zealous advo-
cates has a strong ex ante influence on how they advise their cli-
ents.35 Professor Cassandra Burke Robertson argues that when law-
yers are “motivated to zealously represent their clients, a partisan 
bias may shade and distort their legal advice.”36
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Values, Legality, and Corporate Law Practice, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1067, 1069-70 (2007) 
(describing zealousness as central to a libertarian ideal of the lawyer’s role, but noting the 
debate about whether this model is applicable to corporate transactional lawyers).  
 31. See, e.g., supra note 2 and accompanying text; infra notes 74-77, 176 and 
accompanying text.  
 32. See infra notes 51-64, 88-111, 117-39 and accompanying text. 
 33. See generally Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
411, 437 (2008) [hereinafter Kim, Gatekeepers] (explaining that social psychology teaches 
that behavior is the product of “cognitive processes guided by the situation and the roles we 
inhabit in those situations”); Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral 
Inquiry into Lawyers’ Responsibility for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 101-05 (1993) 
(describing how the cognitive process suppresses information that is inconsistent with a 
lawyer’s commitment to the client’s position); Andrew M. Perlman, Unethical Obedience by 
Subordinate Attorneys: Lessons from Social Psychology, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 451, 451-52 
(2007) (explaining the pressure of junior lawyers to be obedient to the senior lawyers in 
their firms); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CONN.
L. REV. 1, 3-30 (2009) (explaining the cognitive and behavioral sciences that support an 
argument that lawyers make biased judgments and drawing on identity theory to explain 
situations that prompt lawyers to offer less than independent advice). 
 34. Kim, Banality of Fraud, supra note 19, at 1014 (describing zealous advocacy as 
one of two agency-centered conceptions of lawyering); see also Gordon, New Role, supra
note 19, at 1194 (“The classic defense of the corporate lawyer’s role, both most often 
advanced and held in reserve if other defenses fail, is of course that we are advocates, 
whose duty is zealous representation of clients.”); Kath Hall, Why Good Intentions are 
Often Not Enough: The Potential for Ethical Blindness in Legal Decision-Making, in
REAFFIRMING LEGAL ETHICS: TAKING STOCK AND NEW IDEAS 210, 216 (Kieran Tranter et al. 
eds., 2010) (citing authorities for the proposition “that lawyers’ conception of their role is 
fundamental to their willingness to rationalize ethical misconduct”). 
 35. Kim, Banality of Fraud, supra note 19, at 1012. 
 36. Robertson, supra note 33, at 40. It is of note that Professor Robertson provides in-
depth analysis of biases that exist when an in-house attorney identifies more as an 
employee of the organization than as a legal professional. Id. at 13-17. In the research she 
cites, study participants were not asked to explain what it means to act as a lawyer (i.e., 
they were not asked if they understand the role to mean “zealous advocate” or “provider of 
independent legal advice”), though most who identified primarily as a lawyer were more 
inclined to provide independent advice. Id. Nonetheless, I do not believe the research can 
be read so broadly as to suggest that lawyers generally understand the role of lawyer as 
being synonymous with provider of independent legal advice.       
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 This discussion leads to the question addressed in the following 
Part: Is it in the business client’s interest for nonlitigation counsel to 
act as a zealous advocate?  
II.   ZEALOUS ADVISING AND ITS HARM TO BUSINESS CLIENTS
 In this Part, I argue that the qualities of zealous advocacy—a rep-
resentation by a nonjudgmental lawyer who pursues the client’s goals 
within the arguable bounds of the law—are incompatible with the 
needs of business clients seeking advice about future conduct. In each 
part of my discussion, I consider an example of a business represen-
tation that bears the hallmarks of zealous advocacy. Though the law-
yers in my discussion did not declare, “My advice is based on the 
principles of zealous advocacy,”37 and they may have been influenced 
by additional factors, their conduct is consistent with the tenets of 
zealous advocacy.  
A.   Zealous Encouragement of Business Clients’ Goals Within the 
Technical Bounds of the Law 
 A key characteristic of zealous advocacy is that the lawyer is lim-
ited by the “bounds of the law.”38 But what is illegal for a business 
client? Attorneys are likely to search for a rule that prohibits or per-
mits the conduct in question.39 That rule might be a statute, regula-
tion, contract provision, or clear standard articulated in case law. Un-
less the rule flatly prohibits the behavior, then zealous advocacy is 
appropriate.40 This technical vision of “the bounds of law” encourages 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 37. Convicted attorney Joseph Collins made a statement that comes close, though. He 
testified on cross examination that it was his obligation to represent his client zealously. 
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.  
 38. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.  
 39. Considering how lawyers analyze their own compliance with the “law” under the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Professor Hazard explains: “As a member of an 
institution whose character is defined by law, the lawyer’s first thought is more likely to 
be: ‘Does Rule Y prohibit/require doing x?’ ” Hazard, Future, supra note 16, at 1255. 
Similarly, if the lawyer considers the limits of the client’s behavior to be “the law,” the 
lawyer will be inclined to search for a rule that prohibits or permits the desired conduct. 
See Gordon, New Role, supra note 19, at 1194 (asserting that to the zealous advocate, law 
“is binding if the rules and facts are clear and there is no plausible basis for spinning 
them”); William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional 
Responsibilities of the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1454 (2006) 
[hereinafter Simon, Confidentiality] (discussing the Bar’s embrace of “formalism—the 
doctrine that only the letter of the law and not its spirit is binding”); Whelan, supra note 
30, at 1080-81 (discussing how Enron used legal opinion letters as a means of justifying 
that accounting treatment was “technically correct” rather than as a tool to assist them  
in decisionmaking).  
 40. See Simon, Confidentiality, supra note 39, at 1457 (quoting Professor Stephen 
Gillers’ assertion that the lawyer’s job “is to figure out how to accomplish the client’s 
objectives within the law and if that can be done only through a technicality, that is not the 
lawyer’s fault”); see also Whelan, supra note 30, at 1124-25 (arguing that current 
professional regulation creates a framework in which: (1) the lawyer pursues the objectives 
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business lawyers to ignore entire bodies of law as they advise and 
pursue a client’s agenda. A search for a black letter rule will rarely 
lead counsel to advise against conduct because it is fraudulent, a 
breach of fiduciary duty, or an obstruction of justice.41 Such viol-
ations are seldom black and white. Indeed, the more complex the 
transaction, the less likely the attorney is to detect a clear violation 
of law.42
 This is where the zealous advocate feels most at home: finding a 
way to achieve the client’s stated goals in a way that is legally defen-
sible.43 Short of a client’s plan to run a red light (illegal) or commit 
murder (illegal), the zealous advocate will likely be able to articulate 
an argument that the conduct is within the bounds of law.44 The 
zealous advocate may even facilitate the client’s desired conduct, 
drafting documents or making representations to third parties, be-
lieving that this is the attorney’s proper role when the conduct in 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
as defined by the client; (2) the lawyer may continue a represent the client even when the 
client acts against the lawyer’s advice; and (3) the client alone is allowed to decide whether 
to pursue or forego “legally available objectives or methods”).  
 41. Tort and criminal liability for fraud may be described in somewhat different ways 
depending on the case law or the statute at issue, but in general, a false statement of 
material fact, intentionally made to a victim that reasonably relies and is thereby injured, 
is fraud. See Susan P. Koniak, Corporate Fraud: See, Lawyers, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
195, 197 (2003) [hereinafter Koniak, Corporate Fraud] (“Fraud is, in plain English, lying to 
someone to get them to give you their stuff.”); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Client 
Fraud Problem as a Justinian Quartet: An Extended Analysis, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1041, 
1044 (1997) [hereinafter Hazard, Client Fraud] (discussing the close relationship between 
tort and criminal fraud liability).  
 42. See, e.g., Whelan, supra note 30, at 1091-97 (discussing the complexity of the 
transactions upon which Enron’s attorneys issued opinion letters; Enron’s outside counsel 
was concerned that the “true issuance” opinions—rather than “true sale” opinions—were 
not sufficient for the FAS rules and that the transactions might need to be restructured, 
but ultimately deferred to Arthur Andersen’s “technical people” who said the true issuance 
opinions were satisfactory for their purposes); see also id. at 1101 (In Vinson & Elkins’ 
investigation of Sherron Watkins’ whistleblower letter, the firm concluded, “Enron and 
Andersen acknowledge that the accounting treatment is aggressive, but no reason to 
believe inappropriate from a technical standpoint.” (emphasis added)).  
 43. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.  
 44. See Gordon, New Role, supra note 19, at 1204 (arguing that the most often 
invoked image of the corporate lawyer’s role is that of adversary-advocate who “is entitled 
to make use of any colorable justification for the client’s conduct that he could use to defend 
it in future adversary proceedings”); Koniak, Corporate Fraud, supra note 41, at 214 (“Most 
talented lawyers can weave an interpretation to justify anything, as long as no adversary is 
present to challenge it and no umpire [is] around to throw out the bizarre interpretation.”).  
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question is arguably or technically legal.45 Rather than advising, the 
lawyer acts as an instrument.46
 While many have discussed how such advocacy harms third par-
ties,47 it is equally true that such advocacy can harm the attorney’s 
own client by encouraging liability-creating conduct.48 While lawyers 
defend this technical approach to legal compliance in the wake of a 
scandal,49 their clients are often the casualty that lies in the back-
ground. The argument seems to be that this is what the client want-
ed and that the lawyer had no choice but to oblige. What the argu-
ment misses is that the client may not have been made aware of the 
risk of liability for pursuing the course of conduct.50 Rather, the law-
yer zealously pursued the client’s stated agenda in a manner that 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 45. See Whelan, supra note 30, at 1113 (describing attorneys’ hyper-technical 
“creative compliance” with regulations, and explaining that the claim that conduct is 
“perfectly legal is a powerful tool of resistance and a substantial challenge to regulators”). 
Professor Whelan asserts that “[c]reative compliance advances the interests of the client 
but, if it results in legal policy failing, then it is, on the face of it, against the public 
interest.” Id. at 1131-32.  
 46. See Roger C. Cramton, Counseling Organizational Clients “Within the Bounds of the 
Law”, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1043, 1055 (2006) [hereinafter Cramton, Organizational Clients]
(asserting that lawyers will not avoid liability for participating in client crime and fraud by 
framing their role as “legal technicians” or “scriveners” rather than what they really are: 
“professionals with a broad responsibility”); Whelan, supra note 30, at 1069 (describing a 
lawyer’s zeal as a slippery slope that can lead to “uncontrolled instrumentalism”).  
 47. See, e.g., Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Public Statement by 
SEC Chairman: Remarks at the SEC Speaks Conference (Feb. 22, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch540.htm (“Lawyers are paid, and are professionally 
obligated, to advocate legitimate views and interests of their clients, with emphasis on the 
word ‘legitimate.’ . . . [I]t is inappropriate for corporate lawyers to assist clients in finding 
ways to evade legal requirements, or disserve the public interest, even if those results can 
be achieved in a manner arguably within the literal letter of the law. . . . Helping a 
company fall within very literal legal prescriptions, even when doing so flies in the face of 
what the particular legal prescriptions were obviously intended to accomplish, endangers 
public confidence . . . .”).  
 48. Cramton, Organizational Clients, supra note 46, at 1054-55 (“The business lawyer 
is a counselor and advisor, not a litigator, and the goal is a sound result that will advance 
the interests of the client ‘within the bounds of the law.’ Wise counseling involves a 
prudent awareness of the existence of legal risk and not an effort in every situation to test 
how far the envelope of the law may be pushed. Lawyers who take the latter approach run a 
grave risk of assisting illegal conduct.” (emphasis added)); Stephen Gillers, Is Law (Still) 
an Honorable Profession?, 19 PROF. LAW. 23, 25 (2009) (“A lawyer who uses his or her legal 
education and skills to distort the law, to destroy the rule of law, because he or she is adept 
at manipulating language, and no judge, no adversary is watching, is as blameworthy as 
the client.”).  
 49. See, e.g., Simon, Confidentiality, supra note 39, at 1456 (asserting that Enron 
attorneys defended the transactions they facilitated by asserting that they complied with 
the literal terms of the law, but that this literal compliance overlooked “very broad 
definitions of fraud and other prohibited practices [in securities laws] that seem to call for 
purposive interpretation”).  
 50. See Kim, Banality of Fraud, supra note 19, at 1063 (arguing that many assume 
company executives are making “explicit, conscious choices” to trade ethics for profit, when 
“motivated reasoning, rather than any explicit calculation, is the driving mechanism”). 
When the “motivated reasoning” Kim discusses is provided by a lawyer, this is a problem 
that the legal profession should address.  
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technically complied with some aspect of the law, but nonetheless 
created liability that a knowledgeable client might have chosen to 
avoid.  
 Legal advice that fits this description might have been provided in 
the case Thornwood, Inc. v. Jenner & Block.51 Law firm Jenner & 
Block represented general partner James Follensbee in negotiations 
with Follensbee’s limited partner, Thomas Thornton.52 Thornton and 
Follensbee’s limited partnership had been developing a residential 
community and golf course.53 Unbeknownst to Thornton, Follensbee 
had obtained a conditional agreement with PGA Tour Golf Course 
Properties, Inc. (PGA) and another entity to develop the course as a 
lucrative PGA Tournament Players Course.54
 When Thornton expressed frustration about the lack of profitabil-
ity of the partnership, Follensbee retained law firm Jenner & Block 
to represent him in acquiring Thornton’s interest.55 Jenner & Block 
also participated in the PGA Tournament Players Course negotia-
tions.56 Neither Follensbee nor his lawyers informed Thornton of the 
conditional agreement with PGA.57 Thornton agreed upon a price for 
Follensbee to purchase Thornton’s interest and signed two docu-
ments drafted by Jenner & Block: one contained a release of all 
claims against Follensbee, specifically referencing claims for breach 
of fiduciary duty;58 the other included a release of all claims against 
Jenner & Block.59
 Upon learning of the PGA agreement four years later,60 Thornton 
sued, alleging that Jenner & Block had aided and abetted Follens- 
bee’s fraud and breach of fiduciary duty61 and seeking rescission 
against Follensbee.62 The court explained the conduct that is re-
quired of a fiduciary, here the general partner in a limited partner-
ship.63 In allowing the aiding and abetting claims to proceed against 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 51. 799 N.E.2d 756 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).  
 52. Id. at 761. 
 53. Id. at 760.  
 54. Id. at 761-62. PGA and Potomac Sports Properties, Inc. (Potomac) had reached an 
agreement with Follensbee regarding course layout and division of profits and duties 
between the PGA, Potomac, and the partnership. Id.
 55. Id. at 761. 
 56. Id. It is not clear from the court’s opinion when that representation commenced 
and whether the firm was hired (and paid) by the partnership or by Follensbee. Id.
 57. Id. at 761-62.  
 58. Id. at 761. 
 59. Id.
 60. Id. at 762. 
 61. Id. at 763 (noting that “Thornton’s claims of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary 
duty, a scheme to defraud, and fraudulent inducement” are all based on “alleged breaches of 
fiduciary duty perpetrated by Follensbee with the assistance of Jenner & Block”).  
 62. Id. at 767 (“The same month that he discovered the alleged fraud, Thornton 
brought a claim against Follensbee seeking to rescind the settlement agreement.”).  
 63. Id. at 765-66.  
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Jenner & Block despite the release, the court noted Jenner & Block’s 
active participation in Follensbee’s misconduct and the lawyers’ 
acknowledgement of that misconduct by specifically listing breach of 
fiduciary duty in the release.64
 The Jenner & Block attorneys’ conduct reflects the characteristics 
of zealous advocacy. They acted as if anything that was arguably 
within the bounds of the law was appropriate. Accordingly, they fo-
cused on technical legal issues (obtaining a release of all claims) ra-
ther than the substantive steps that the client should take to avoid 
liability (disclosing the conditional agreement). The lawyers drafted 
the release with the hope of cleansing the transaction. And while 
they recognized that they were playing an active role in the fraudu-
lent scheme, they set out to accomplish the client’s goals and hoped to 
protect the client with the first release and themselves with  
the second.  
 Thornwood also exemplifies the problem that no one is watching 
when a zealous advisor is at work. It is “the watching” that makes 
zealous advocacy work in a courtroom.65 In litigation, counsel argues 
the best version of the facts and law (after the alleged misconduct 
has already occurred), and that argument is “checked” by the pres-
ence of the judge or jury.66 The lawyer will not usually prevail if the 
argument is too outlandish.67 There is no such check on the business 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 64. Id. at 766-67 (“Instead, Jenner & Block was involved in the drafting of the 
releases in question and, allegedly, in the acts underlying Follensbee’s fraud. The very 
insertion of the clause in the settlement agreement that purports to release certain 
fiduciary duties between Follensbee and Thornton from October 1, 1994, until the date the 
release was signed indicates an awareness that breaches of fiduciary duties might have 
occurred during that time.”).  
 65. Gillers, supra note 48, at 24 (When courtroom advocacy is used outside of the 
courtroom, “there is no judge and no adversary. No one is watching. And there may never 
be anyone watching. Then, the temptation is to push the limits, sift the language of the 
law, [and] find hidden meanings.”).  
 66. See Roger C. Cramton et al., Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-
Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725, 770 (2004) (explaining the protections in litigation that guard 
against abuse of the litigator’s “license to manipulate fact and law”); Gillers, supra note 48, 
at 24 (explaining that the advocacy model of the lawyer’s role “envisions a trial lawyer, 
usually a criminal defense lawyer, whose arguments can be challenged by an opposing 
lawyer and will be exposed to the ruling of a judge”); Hatfield, supra note 25, at 6 
(“[B]iased zealousness is justified by an appeal to the adversarial American legal system. 
Each side has a lawyer, and each lawyer is devoted to one side. . . . We are told to suspend 
our personal moral instincts and to have faith that the legal system accomplishes a greater 
moral good . . . . ” (footnote omitted)); Fred C. Zacharias, Fitting Lying to the Court into the 
Central Moral Tradition of Lawyering, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 491, 497 (2008) 
[hereinafter Zacharias, Lying] (asserting that however strong the justification for a single 
ethic of devotion to the client may be in criminal cases, “for lawyers who serve as advisors, 
counselors, negotiators, and facilitators of cooperative ventures, the ethic often seems out 
of place”).  
67. See Gordon, New Role, supra note 19, at 1204-05 (asserting that for corporate 
lawyers, there are none of the “bothersome conditions” of the courtroom, leaving them to 
“stretch the rules and facts very extravagantly in their clients’ favor without risking 
contradiction by adversaries, or the annoyed reactions of judges or regulators”); W. Bradley 
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advisor’s monologue justifying the client’s desired conduct.68 When 
zealous advocacy is a lawyer’s guide outside of the courtroom, the 
lawyer misses what a competent lawyer is obligated to see: The client 
has an interest in knowing when proposed conduct may create legal 
liability.69 If a lawyer zealously advocates the client’s agenda—and no 
one is there to check that advocacy—the client may not understand 
that the plan leaves him or her vulnerable to liability for breach of 
fiduciary duty70 or fraud,71 for example. 
 Counsel’s advice in the Thornwood matter was not only bad for 
the client, but it was also bad for the advisors who faced aiding and 
abetting liability.72 Though the issue of lawyer liability to third par-
ties is beyond the scope of this Article, the Bar’s arguments against 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1167, 1182 (2005) (arguing 
that “transactional lawyering lacks the essential elements of litigation” such that they 
should not be analogized to one another, noting that in litigation there is “an impartial 
referee, orderly procedures, rules for obtaining, introducing, and excluding evidence, and a 
competent opposing party”).  
 68. SUSAN R. MARTYN & LAWRENCE J. FOX, TRAVERSING THE ETHICAL MINEFIELD:
PROBLEMS, LAW, AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 230 (2d ed. 2008) (explaining 
Professor Deborah Rhode’s argument that when lawyers counsel clients rather than 
litigate on their behalf, the lawyer is “deal[ing] with ongoing and future behavior, which 
provides an opportunity and obligation to prevent, rather than justify” misconduct); 
Cramton et al., supra note 66, at 770 (asserting that the attorney advisor should not give a 
client advice in the style of a zealous advocate—such that the client “can act based on some 
unprecedented vision of what the law requires or some barely plausible interpretation of 
facts”); Gillers, supra note 48, at 24 (asserting that the advocacy model, when used by legal 
advisors, can undermine the rule of law itself). 
 69. See MARTYN & FOX, supra note 68, at 226 (arguing that when lawyers put too 
much emphasis on following client instructions about the client’s goals, then lawyers 
become “instruments”; then they “disserve the client by failing to share their independent 
view of the merits of the course of action and they open their clients to potential liability”); 
Koniak, Corporate Fraud, supra note 41, at 213-14 (“Whatever justification the adversarial 
process provides for litigators, pushing the limits of law to justify client conduct that is 
contemplated . . . is another matter altogether. When passing on the legality of 
contemplated or ongoing client conduct, there is no adversary present to challenge 
stretched legal interpretations, and there is no umpire available to judge between 
competing visions of what the law allows.”). 
 70. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Robert V. Ricca, (Not) Advising Corporate Officers 
About Fiduciary Duties, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 663, 663 (2007) (quoting deposition 
testimony of Stephen Bollenbach, Chief Financial Officer and Director of the Walt Disney 
Company who testified, “I was not aware that it was a breach of the duty of loyalty to place 
one’s own interests ahead of the interests of shareholders.”). Johnson and Ricca assert that 
virtually no attention has been paid to lawyers properly advising corporate officers as to 
the scope and thrust of their fiduciary duties. See id. at 683 (“Lawyers must not simply 
assume either that officers understand these duties or that it is someone else’s 
responsibility to advise them concerning those duties.”). 
 71. See Patrick E. Longan, Teaching Professionalism, 60 MERCER L. REV. 659, 671 
(2009) (“Some clients undoubtedly want to take actions that would constitute fraud, either 
on others or on a court. However, a lawyer who refuses to assist these activities actually 
serves the client well . . . . [M]any of these clients want to take these actions without the 
knowledge that they are illegal. Lawyers are experts in the boundaries of the law, and 
most clients surely want to conform their conduct to the law. The lawyer who counsels a 
client about a proposed course of action helps the client do so.”).  
 72. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
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such liability reflect the belief that lawyer-advisors are obligated to 
be zealous advocates.73 One commentator argues that the result of 
aiding and abetting liability is that “[a]ttorneys will constantly try to 
balance their duty to zealously represent their clients with the fears 
of potential exposure to liability in instances when their legal advice 
may disregard the interests of the third parties.”74 Other arguments 
against aiding and abetting liability include that it punishes the law-
yer for doing his or her job,75 it may cause the lawyer to take self-
protective measures,76 and it is inconsistent with having an undivid-
ed responsibility to the client.77
 What these critics miss is that zealous advocacy in the advising 
context is counter to the client’s interests. Dissuading lawyers of 
zealous advocacy outside litigation would be good for clients and for 
the profession because when the zeal is gone, it might be replaced by 
substantive advice about how to avoid legal liability. Moreover, the 
purportedly “self-protective” measures that a lawyer may take are 
entirely consistent with the client’s interests: advising against con-
duct that is inconsistent with a client’s fiduciary duty.  
B.   Zealous Advocates do not Judge the Morality of a Client’s  
Proposed Conduct 
 Zealous advocacy is also the rationale for lawyers ignoring their 
conceptions of right and wrong as they assist a client in reaching his 
or her goal.78 Professor Stephen Gillers notes that lawyers usually 
justify their conduct by explaining that “[t]he client calls the shots.”79
Lawyers are not to decide if client goals are worthy but only whether 
they are legal.80
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 73. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 74. Katerina P. Lewinbuk, Let’s Sue All the Lawyers: The Rise of Claims Against 
Lawyers for Aiding and Abetting a Client’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 135, 
169 (2008); see also Jessica Palvino, Aiding-and-Abetting Liability: Is Privity Making a 
Comeback?, 70 TEX. B.J. 52, 52 (2007) (arguing that the threat of aiding and abetting 
liability “is enough to create pause in an attorney’s zealous representation of her client and 
force her to consider her own self-interests”).  
 75. Palvino, supra note 74, at 53 (“Aiding-and-abetting claims are particularly 
appealing to plaintiffs’ attorneys because, in theory, a lawyer can be liable for doing 
nothing more than representing his or her clients’ interests successfully.” (emphasis added)).  
 76. Lewinbuk, supra note 74, at 169 (asserting that aiding and abetting breach of 
fiduciary duty liability “might diminish the quality of legal services, since it would impose 
‘self protective reservations’ in the attorney-client relationship” (quoting Chem-Age Indus. 
v. Glover, 652 N.W.2d 756, 774 (S.D. 2002)).  
 77. Id. at 136 (asserting that a lawyer was traditionally viewed as owing an undivided 
responsibility to her client, which “led to the legal doctrine that only the client could bring 
a legal action against her lawyer if she was dissatisfied with the rendered professional 
service,” but that the doctrine is changing to allow nonclients to sue lawyers). 
 78. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (discussing role morality and 
zealous advocacy).  
 79. Gillers, supra note 48, at 24.   
 80. Id. 
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 The problem with business lawyers separating morality from le-
gality is that morality often bears upon legal liability.81 Ignoring 
moral intuitions about a business client’s plan often means ignoring 
the basis for liability, such as a lack of good faith or fraudulent in-
tent.82 Similarly, a fiduciary’s obligations of loyalty and trust are in-
extricably intertwined with doing what is “right.”83 Professors John-
son and Ricca assert that the “absence of . . . moral-sounding lan-
guage” about fiduciary duty from the company lawyer may lead an 
entity client’s constituents to believe they can act in their own self-
interest.84 Competent lawyers cannot ignore morality in these con-
texts, and doing so disserves their clients who may not understand 
the connection between legal liability and morally questionable con-
duct.85 Ironically, the need for lawyers to focus on the connection be-
tween ethics and legality is undercut by arguments that encourage 
lawyers to focus on morality for morality’s sake. Commentators urge 
lawyers to make decisions (such as to withdraw from a representa-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 81. See Charles W. Murdock, Fairness and Good Faith as a Precept in the Law of 
Corporations and Other Business Organizations, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 551, 551 (2005) 
(“Matters like fairness, good faith, loyalty, conflicts of interest, and other fiduciary duty 
concerns implicate ethical values.”). Professor Hatfield describes his conception of the 
problem with lawyers’ moral deference to the client and the legal system:  
The lawyer defers to the client’s conclusions about the morality of the objective. 
The lawyer defers to the legal system’s conclusion that the client, rather than 
the lawyer, is morally responsible for the objective. This moral passivity, moral 
silence, moral deference, is what we associate with lynch mobs, Nazis, those 
who shock patients because they are told to, and those who conclude torture is 
permissible because experts tell them it should be. And, I fear, most lawyers 
have accepted moral deference as justified, as if it were essential to being a 
good lawyer, and without considering how it affects the capacity to be a good 
person. 
Hatfield, supra note 25, at 9. My point (which is slightly different from Professor 
Hatfield’s) is that moral deference leads to poor legal advice. The examples cited by 
Hatfield all raise issues not just of morality but also of legality. Lawyers who do not 
consider the moral questions posed here ignore the obligation to help clients make 
judgments about legality that is impacted by morality. A lawyer who defers in such areas 
does so at the client’s peril.  
 82. See supra note 81. 
 83. Johnson & Ricca, supra note 70, at 686 (“We believe that persons who, in strong 
language, are told by a respected figure, such as legal counsel, that they owe a special 
responsibility to protect and advance the interests of others are more likely to refrain from 
negative conduct and engage in positive conduct than are people who believe they can 
solely advance their own interest. To advise someone that they have been ‘entrusted’ with 
responsibility for others’ money and that they must be ‘loyal’ to those persons’ interests . . . 
is likely . . . to lead the listener . . . to perform at a higher level.” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 
686-87 (“Fiduciary obligations flow from a principle within the moral sense that sensitizes 
us to the use of power when others come into view. Fiduciary thinking gives us a morality 
for decision making, an ethics of character, and wisdom. Fiduciary thinking makes us 
trustworthy, enhancing thereby the moral quality of that society in which we live and 
work.” (quoting STEPHEN YOUNG, MORAL CAPITALISM: RECONCILING PRIVATE INTEREST 
WITH THE PUBLIC GOOD 59 (2003))).  
 84. Id. at 687.  
 85. See id.
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tion) based on ethics, even if the conduct in question is “technically” 
legal.86 Even the Model Rules imply that advice about what is “moral” 
is different from advice about the “law.”87 These positions further the 
misimpression that doing the right thing is different from doing the 
legal thing.   
 The case Anderson v. Wilder88 exemplifies the repercussions of not 
counseling about the connection between unethical conduct and the 
prospect of legal liability. Brett Wilder was the president of Future-
Point Administrative Services, LLC, a member-managed LLC.89 Wil-
der consulted some of his fellow members about expelling other 
members so that those expelled members’ ownership units could be 
sold to an interested purchaser at a substantial profit.90 Wilder 
pointed to the expulsion provision, which allowed expulsion without 
cause by a majority vote and provided that expelled members would 
receive only the return of their original capital contribution ($150 per 
ownership unit).91
 Member Charles Quade told Wilder that he would not expel the 
other members and sell their interest for a profit because he did not 
“think it was ethical”;92 Quade suggested that the offer be revealed to 
all FuturePoint owners.93 Thereafter, the full membership discussed 
the offer and whether selling members would be entitled to their 
share of $63,000 in profits held in the company’s operating account.94
Wilder introduced a motion that would permit willing members to 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 86. Gillers, supra note 48, at 25. Professor Gillers asserts that lawyers should not 
distort the law with clever arguments influenced by the client’s desires, but then he 
explains that “[l]oyalty [to the client] does not require [lawyers] to aid morally offensive 
goals, even if they are legal.” Id. While I agree with Professor Gillers’ assertion that loyalty 
does not require assistance in morally offensive goals, his argument may further the 
misimpression that there is a divide between what is legal and what is morally right. I 
would frame the issue in this way: Distorting the law with clever arguments often results 
in the client’s illegal conduct because those clever, technical arguments actually ignore the 
prospect of legal liability. When the lawyer’s arguments further the client’s illegal conduct, 
this is assuredly not loyal to the client.  
 87. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2009) (“In representing a client, a 
lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In 
rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as
moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation.” 
(emphasis added)).  
 88. No. E2006-02647-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 2700068 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2007). 
 89. Id. at *1-4. Pursuant to the company’s operating agreement, the management 
committee had “the power and authority to contract on behalf of the company by a majority vote. 
[The] management committee was comprised of Plaintiffs Michael Atkins, Charles Quade, and 
Bill Thompson, and Defendants Lamarr Stout and Brett Wilder.” Anderson v. Wilder, No. 
E2003-00460-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22768666, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2003).  
 90. Wilder, 2007 WL 2700068, at *4. 
 91. Id. at *3-4. Thereafter, Wilder prepared a chart showing which members could be 
expelled, how much it would cost to pay each their capital contribution, and how much the 
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sell up to 499 ownership units to the prospective purchaser for $250 
per unit.95 The motion failed,96 and the owners agreed that the man-
agement committee would have a meeting to discuss the $63,000 in 
profits the following Wednesday.97
 After the vote failed, Wilder consulted attorney Lewis Howard, Jr. 
about the expulsion of minority owners.98 Howard testified that he 
“read the entire operating agreement” and had “fairly lengthy discus-
sions with Mr. Wilder about what was going on [and] who all the 
people were.”99 He concluded that the majority and minority owners 
were “diametrically opposed” and that “under the operating agree-
ment, [Wilder’s majority] had the ability to vote to expel members, 
and I advised them that they could do that under  
this agreement.”100
 Days later, Wilder organized a majority of members to vote to ex-
pel the owners of 47% of the company, paying them $150 per unit. 101
Voting with the majority were owners of a 3% interest in the compa-
ny who were paid (later that same day) $333 for their ownership 
units. 102 Thereafter the majority sold 499 membership units to a pur-
chaser for $250 per unit.103
 The expelled members sued, alleging that defendant members 
breached fiduciary duties, including a duty of good faith.104 At a jury 
trial, the defendants argued that they acted in accordance with the 
operating agreement and that the expulsion had been necessitated by 
the fear that the management committee would disburse the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 95. Id. Pursuant to the operating agreement, any voluntary transfer of a member’s 
ownership interest had to be offered first to the other owners. Id. at *3.  
 96. Id. at *5.  
 97. Id.
 98. Id. at *13. 
 99. Id.
 100. Id.
 101. Id. at *1-2. 
 102. Id. at *1, *6. One of the 3% co-owners, Mr. Freeman, testified that he thought the 
expelled members would receive a fair return on their investment and that he was 
surprised when he saw the allegations in the complaint: “I guess this was the first clue that 
there was probably not good faith within this committee.” Id. at *11.  
 103. Id. at *3.  
 104. Id. The plaintiffs relied upon Tennessee case law regarding corporations and 
partnerships, as well as the Tennessee limited liability company (LLC) statute. Anderson 
v. Wilder, No. E2003-00460-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22768666, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 
21, 2003). Years earlier, the trial court had granted the Defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment, but the Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed that judgment and remanded the 
matter to the trial court to determine if the expulsion had been in good faith or in violation 
of fiduciary duty. Id. at *11. In that 2003 decision, the court explained that a majority 
member of an LLC owes the minority a fiduciary duty just as a majority shareholder does 
in a corporation (as stated in previous Tennessee precedent) and that its holding was 
consistent with the Tennessee LLC statute which provides that members of an LLC must 
discharge their duties in good faith and with care and loyalty. Id. at *6.  
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$63,000.105 After years of litigation, including two appeals, a mistrial, 
and a jury verdict,106 the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the 
trial court’s judgment entered in accordance with the jury’s verdict, 
awarding plaintiffs $76,624 and prejudgment interest of $22,271.36, 
for a total judgment of $98,895.36.107
 While attorney Howard, like Quade, may have questioned the eth-
ics of the expulsion plan, he apparently suppressed any such 
thoughts in the model of zealous advocacy. Instead, he focused on the 
technical language of the operating agreement.108 Howard’s testimony 
does not reflect that he provided any advice about fiduciary duty or 
regarding the facts a jury might consider if a post-expulsion lawsuit 
were filed.109 In turn, Howard’s clients did not try to justify the ex-
pulsion decision as being the product of good faith, much less actually 
attempt to act in good faith. At least two defendants asserted that 
they had expelled the other members simply because they could un-
der the terms of the operating agreement.110
 Of course, this conclusion is one the majority members could have 
reached without consulting an attorney. The operating agreement’s 
terms appeared to permit expulsion by a vote of the majority.111 One 
might wonder, then, why the majority owners (through Wilder) con-
sulted an attorney. One possibility is that they suspected the ouster 
of their co-owners for $150 per unit in order to immediately sell the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 105. Anderson, 2007 WL 2700068, at *6. The plaintiffs countered that the expulsion 
had included members who were not on the management committee, that even the 
disbursement of the entire $63,000 would not have harmed the company, and that the 
management committee could have been (and was) disbanded without the expulsion. Id. at 
*6, *9-10. When asked why he expelled Cherry Zimmerman, a person who was not on the 
management committee, Wilder testified, “I made a decision based on-upon [sic] what I 
thought was in the best interest of the company.” Id. at *7. 
 106.  Id. at *3-4. 
 107. Id. at *13, *16.
 108. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.  
 109. See Anderson, 2007 WL 2700068, at *13. Though the issue of whether majority 
members of a member-managed LLC owe the minority a fiduciary duty was an issue of 
first impression in Tennessee, there was ample legal authority suggesting that co-owners 
owe one another a fiduciary duty. See Anderson, 2003 WL 22768666, at *4-6. One relevant 
authority was a statute that provided that members of a member-managed LLC shall 
discharge their duties in good faith, with the care of an ordinarily prudent person, and in 
the best interest of the LLC. Id. at *6 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-240-102 (West 2010)). 
A client would want to know about such authority—and the relevance of arguably 
unethical behavior to the question of good faith—even if the precise issue of fiduciary duty 
owed to individual members had never been addressed by a Tennessee court.  
 110. When asked why he had voted to expel the plaintiffs, defendant Stout testified, “I 
didn’t have a cause. I had Wheaties that morning. It didn’t matter. We didn’t want them in 
the organization.” Anderson, 2007 WL 2700068, at *10. Another defendant, Tim Welles, 
testified that he voted for expulsion because he understood the expelled members would 
distribute all or a part of the company’s cash and that he considered that information “to 
be a certain degree valid and made a decision based on that, which again, according to the 
operating agreement, I can do. The members–the majority can vote to do things with or 
without cause.” Id. at *11. 
 111. Id. at *3. 
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same units for $250 each (while paying some remaining members 
$333 for their units) was somehow prohibited by law.112 Unfortunate-
ly, their attorney did not provide them with the advice that would 
have supported this fear and might have helped them avoid a sub-
stantial judgment against them. 
C.   Zealous Pursuit of the Business Organization Client’s Goals as 
Declared by Company Management 
 Zealous advocacy by a business lawyer is especially dangerous 
when the client is an organization. The organization does not neces-
sarily share identity with company managers who are setting its 
agenda. When the company lawyer zealously advocates every scheme 
developed by those managers, the company stands to lose.113 While 
client autonomy may justify allowing a natural person to make a self-
destructive, liability-creating decision, that same justification is not 
present for the entity client.114 The entity client, more than any other 
client, needs a legal advisor to make judgments about what conduct 
may create legal liability and to protect it from such decisions.115
 The results of zealous advocacy by the organization’s lawyer are 
evident in the Refco matter addressed in the opening paragraphs of 
this Article.116 Attorney Joseph Collins and attorneys under his su-
pervision at the Mayer Brown firm played a significant role in help-
ing company management hide millions of dollars in uncollectable 
debt.117 Central to the scheme were seventeen round-trip loan trans-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 112. Another possibility is that they simply wanted an attorney to rubber-stamp their 
decision to expel the minority, perhaps believing that an attorney’s approval would 
insulate them from liability. Even if that was the goal, the defendants were incorrect that 
the attorney’s agreement would protect them from liability. And again, the attorney would 
have better served his clients by advising about possible bases for liability.  
 113. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2009); Cramton, Organizational 
Clients, supra note 46, at 1054 (“All corporate frauds start with lawyers treating senior 
management as the client and failing to communicate with higher authority within 
management . . . .”); Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done: The Bar’s Struggle 
with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1237 (2003) [hereinafter Koniak, Hurlyburly]
(describing lawyer participation in corporate fraud and asserting that the lawyers thought 
they were going all out for their clients, but in reality they were working for “the reckless 
and dishonest cowboys in control of their clients”); William H. Simon, Whom (Or What) 
Does the Organization’s Lawyer Represent?: An Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 CAL. L.
REV. 57, 64-65 (2003) (asserting that in house counsel may wrongly equate management’s 
interests as those of the company).  
 114. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.  
 115. See infra notes 171-74, 200-204 and accompanying text (discussing the goal of 
Model Rule 1.13 as encouraging lawyers to protect their organizational clients from legal 
liability created by constituent misconduct).  
 116. See supra notes 2-13 and accompanying text.  
 117. In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 609 F. Supp. 2d 304, 305-09 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). To 
provide factual background here (and at the opening of this Article), I cite this order from 
the putative securities fraud class action because it contains a comprehensive statement of 
the facts in a reported case. The court dismissed the claims against Collins and his firm, 
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actions between 2000 and 2005, always at the end of a fiscal year or 
quarter (and reversed shortly after).118 Mayer Brown lawyers pre-
pared loan documents whereby one Refco entity loaned money to 
third parties, who in turn loaned the money to a second Refco entity, 
so that the second Refco entity could pay off a debt it would otherwise 
be unable to pay to the first Refco entity.119 This temporarily removed 
hundreds of millions of dollars in uncollectable related-party debt 
from the company’s books and replaced it with what appeared to be a 
collectable debt from an unrelated party.120 The only money that ac-
tually changed hands in these transactions was the money paid as 
“interest” to the unrelated third parties who facilitated the bad debt’s 
temporary removal from the books.121
 In 2004, Thomas H. Lee Partners (THL) purchased a majority in-
terest in Refco through a leveraged buyout financed with $507 mil-
lion in cash from THL, $600 million in bonds issued by Refco to in-
vestors, and $800 million Refco borrowed from a syndicate of 
banks.122 One year later, Refco conducted a $670 million initial public 
offering (IPO).123 All the while, Refco’s CEO and other executives 
were selling their stock, pocketing tens of millions of dollars.124 Mayer 
Brown lawyers, under Collins’ supervision, represented Refco in all of 
these transactions.125 Only two months after the IPO, on October 10, 
2005, Refco announced that it had discovered the related party re-
ceivable and that its financial statements could not be relied upon for 
the preceding four years.126 The company collapsed and filed for 
bankruptcy on October 17, 2005.127
 Like key Refco executives,128 attorney Collins was indicted, tried, 
and convicted for his role in the massive fraud.129 If his testimony in 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
concluding the plaintiff-investors failed to state a claim under Rule 10b-5 and Section 20(a) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at 311-19. 
 118. Id. at 307-08.  
 119. Id. at 307. 
 120. Id.
 121. Id. at 307 n.4. 
 122. Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 590 F.3d 186, 189 (2d Cir. 2009).  
 123. In re Refco Inc. Sec. Litig., 609 F. Supp. 2d at 308.  
 124. Id.
 125. Id. at 308-09.  
 126. Id. at 308 n.7.  
 127. Id. 
 128. Refco executives Phillip Bennett, Robert Trosten, Tone Grant, and Santo Maggio 
were all indicted and each either pleaded guilty or was convicted. Press Release, U.S. Att’y 
S. Dist. of N.Y., Refco’s Principal Outside Attorney Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court 
to Seven Years in Prison for $2.4 Billion Fraud 3 (Jan. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Press Release, 
U.S. Att’y].  
 129. Collins was indicted on charges of aiding and abetting securities fraud, wire fraud, 
bank fraud, false filing with the SEC, and conspiracy to commit these and other crimes. See
Indictment, United States v. Collins, No. S1 07 Cr. 1170 (LBS) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2007). In 
July 2009, a jury convicted Collins of conspiracy, two counts of securities fraud, and two 
counts of wire fraud. Press Release, U.S. Att’y, supra note 128, at 1. On January 14, 2010, 
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the criminal trial is believed,130 what he described is behavior con-
sistent with zealous advocacy. Collins repeatedly asserted that he did 
not know that he or company executives were engaged in anything 
“fraudulent” or “criminal.”131 Prior to trial, Collins passed a polygraph 
test in which he was asked if he had been told there was over one bil-
lion dollars in intercompany debt or if he was aware that it was being 
concealed from purchaser THL.132 He answered in the negative to 
these questions.133 In other words, Collins asserted (and apparently 
may have even believed) that he did not knowingly act outside the 
bounds of the law—the line that cannot be crossed by a zealous advo-
cate.
 Similarly, when describing why he did not reveal a Proceeds Par-
ticipation Agreement and related documents during due diligence 
with purchaser THL (documents that prosecutors argued would have 
revealed guarantees related to the staggering intercompany debt),134
Collins testified to a number of technical reasons that supported the 
documents’ nondisclosure and repeatedly asserted that such deci-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Collins was sentenced to seven years in prison. Id. at 1; Bray, supra note 13, at C6; see also 
Ameet Sachdev, Former Mayer Brown Partner Sentenced to 7 Years, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 15, 
2010, at 23. 
 130. I rely upon the criminal trial testimony because Collins did not testify in the 
malpractice case, which admittedly is a case more closely related to the subject of this 
Article. I acknowledge that his testimony was framed to respond to the criminal charges 
and not to respond to the issue of whether his conduct harmed his client. I also concede 
that his testimony was likely not believed by the jury, given his conviction. My point is 
simply that even his self-interested account provides an unflattering portrait of  
zealous advocacy.  
 131. See, e.g., Trial Transcript, supra note 2, at 3493 (testifying that he did not commit 
fraud on behalf of Refco); id. at 3520 (testifying that no one at Refco ever confided that they 
were engaged in any fraud or crime); id. at 3876 (He did not understand that a $500 
million distribution was “associated with any kind of fraud.”); id. at 4008 (testifying that he 
did not do anything to deceive investors in the 2004 bond offering in 2004 or in the initial 
public offering in 2005); id. at 4065 (asserting that he “certainly would have remembered if 
Refco executive Maggio [had] told [him] that he wanted to commit a crime”).  
 132. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Joseph P. Collins’ Pre-Trial 
Motions at 12-13, United States v. Collins, No. 07 Cr. 1170 (LBS) (S.D.N.Y. 2010 June 27, 
2008). The three questions that Collins was asked and answered in the negative were 
these:  
1. At the time of the sale of Refco stock to Thomas Lee, were you aware that the 
inter-company debt was being concealed from him? 
2. At the time of the sale of Refco stock to Thomas Lee, had you been told there 
was over a billion dollars in inter-company debt? 
3. At the time of the sale of Refco stock to Thomas Lee, did you tell anyone that 
there was over a billion dollars in inter-company debt?  
Id. at 13. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See Press Release, U.S. Att’y, supra note 128, at 2 (explaining that the document 
would have revealed Refco’s guarantees of performance of Refco’s related company “in 
amounts totaling billions of dollars”).  
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sions were made with the client.135 Again, this focus on the technical 
and acting at the direction of company executives, rather than mak-
ing an effort to protect the client from legal liability, is consistent 
with zealous advocacy.136
 In yet another example, Collins claimed that he was never told the 
purpose of the quarterly round-trip loans that were central to the 
fraud.137 He simply followed client instructions and directed firm at-
torneys to prepare the loan documents.138 Collins claimed that if he 
had been told the loans’ fraudulent purpose, he “would have resigned 
the representation at that point.”139 Even if Collins never asked 
about the purpose of the loans, his failure to do so fundamentally 
failed his client. Reticence to ask too many questions for fear of learn-
ing the answer is often a tactic of the courtroom advocate,140 but the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 135. See, e.g., Trial Transcript, supra note 2, at 3677-79 (describing the side letter to 
the Proceeds Participation Agreement as an “upstream” agreement that did not need to be 
disclosed and that no one at Refco told him that payments made under the Proceeds 
Participation Agreement would be hidden from auditors or potential buyers like Thomas H. 
Lee); id. at 3712-14 (explaining that Bennett told Collins that Collins should not turn over 
“upstream” agreements in response to due diligence requests from Thomas H. Lee’s 
attorneys because “Lee was buying Refco Group [Ltd.] and that they didn’t need to know 
anything about [Refco Group Holdings, Inc.]”); id. at 3714-18 (explaining his understanding 
of the basis for not disclosing upstream agreements, including a covenant signed by 
Bennett); id. at 3720-23 (asserting that nondisclosure of the upstream agreement would 
not foreclose the purchaser from learning financial information it needed to do the 
transaction); id. at 3848-49 (asserting that obligations under the Proceeds Participation 
Agreement were rendered effectively meaningless by signing a reversion rights agreement, 
which justified nondisclosure); id. at 4006-08 (explaining that he considered section 6.2(a) 
of the contract and that it gave him “additional comfort” that he did not have to disclose 
the Proceeds Participation Agreement); id. at 4046-48 (summarizing the reasons for not 
disclosing the document, including discussions with Mr. Bennett); id at 4435 (agreeing on 
cross-examination that the Proceeds Participation Agreement was on his mind during due 
diligence, he knew it would not be disclosed, and that he talked to Bennett about not 
disclosing it).  
 136. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.  
 137. See, e.g., Trial Transcript, supra note 2, at 3494 (testifying that no one told him 
the purpose of the loans was to move debt off of Refco’s books and to pay down hidden 
intercompany debt); id. at 4161 (stating that he believed the loans were a continuation of a 
previous relationship with a customer). Collins bolstered his argument that he did not 
know that the round-trip loans were being used fraudulently by asserting that he 
delegated the duty to document the loans to other attorneys in his firm and that he had 
only limited involvement with the loans. See, e.g., id. at 3607 (explaining the associates’ 
primary role); id. at 3616-17 (explaining the lack of work he did on the loans and that he 
did not think of the loans in the course of due diligence in the 2004 Lee transaction or 
during meetings with Chase Bank regarding Refco’s credit agreement); id. at 3618-19 
(asserting that he was not part of a scheme to defraud Chase by not revealing the round-
trip loan guarantees); id. at 3731-32 (explaining that he did not reveal the round-trip loans 
to Lee’s representatives because he did not remember them); id. at 3849 (explaining that the 
round-trip loans should have been disclosed, but he had “no abiding memory of them,” and 
the client did not remind him of the loans); id. at 4163-64 (admitting that he knew about the 
round-trip loans and worked on them in 2000 to 2005, but no longer remembers them).   
 138. See testimony described in supra note 137. 
 139. See, e.g., Trial Transcript, supra note 2, at 3617.  
 140. Green, Criminal Regulation, supra note 30, at 356 (discussing attorney conduct 
rules that require action by attorneys with knowledge of client wrongdoing and noting that 
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business advisor does not assist his client in adopting this approach. 
Unlike the courtroom advocate whose client’s conduct occurred in the 
past, a business advisor still has the ability to advise against liabil-
ity-creating conduct. Further, if unsuccessful in persuading man-
agement to take corrective action, the advisor also has the ability to 
take other steps to protect the client from liability. If attorneys simp-
ly perform any task assigned by an entity client’s constituents with-
out finding out the reason, they are leaving the company—the actual 
client—unprotected.  
 As briefly discussed in the introduction of this Article, the mal-
practice case filed against Collins’ law firm by the litigation trustee 
highlights the differing views on whether Collins helped or hurt his 
client.141 The trustee asserted that the law firm’s conduct harmed the 
company, in violation of a lawyer’s obligations as the company’s at-
torney.142 Ruling on the lawyers’ motion to dismiss, then-U.S. District 
Court Judge Gerard Lynch concluded that the alleged fraud benefited 
Refco—at least in the short run—thus depriving the bankruptcy 
trustee standing to sue for malpractice under the Wagoner rule.143
The court engaged in a two-part analysis: (1) since management par-
ticipated in the misconduct, the trustee does not have standing to 
bring the cause of action under Wagoner;144 and (2) the adverse inter-
est exception does not apply because the company benefitted in the 
short term from management’s conduct (i.e., the agents did not total-
ly abandon the company’s interests, thus it is appropriate for the 
agents’ conduct to be imputed to the company).145 The justification for 
the Wagoner rule and similar unclean hands and in pari delicto rules 
in other jurisdictions is that a company (or its successor, such as a 
bankruptcy trustee) cannot sue to recover for a wrong that the com-
pany took part in.146
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
“[m]any lawyers understand that some degree of conscious avoidance is permitted, if not 
essential to effective advocacy”).  
 141. See supra Introduction.  
 142. Complaint, supra note 7; see also Final Report of Examiner at 230-281, In re Refco Inc., 
No. 05-60006 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y July 11, 2007); id. app. A at 7-9 (court-appointed examiner 
describes cause of action against Refco’s attorneys and explains that damages from professional 
negligence include “increased liability caused by the defendant’s deficient services”).  
 143. Kirschner v. Grant Thornton LLP, No. 07 Civ. 11604 (GEL), 2009 WL 1286326, at 
*10 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2009). 
 144. Id. at *5 (citing Shearson Lehman Hutton v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(noting that a bankruptcy trustee lacked standing to recover on behalf of a debtor against third 
parties for injuries incurred by the misconduct of the debtor’s controlling managers)). 
 145. Id. at *6-8 (analyzing the alleged facts under cases including In re Wedtech Corp., 
81 B.R. 240, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (explaining that for the adverse interest exception to the 
Wagoner rule to apply, company officers must have “totally abandoned” the corporation’s 
interests and that the exception does not apply if there was any “short term benefit” to  
the corporation)).  
 146. See id. at *5 & n.13 (explaining that the Wagoner rule and in pari delicto rule 
derive from agency law and have the same purpose of preventing the company or its 
successor in bankruptcy from recovering for a wrong management took part in, but that 
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 Undoubtedly, the Wagoner, in pari delicto, and unclean hands doc-
trines have some logical appeal. But these rules may encourage zeal-
ous advocacy that is harmful to business clients. If a lawyer can ward 
off a professional negligence claim when company executives partici-
pated in the misconduct and there was some short term benefit to the 
company, the lawyer can feel reasonably secure in acting as a zealous 
advocate of management’s agenda.147 Unless an exception to the doc-
trine applies, the lawyer is not answerable to the company—the true 
client—for not protecting it from the executives who would create 
substantial liability or perhaps even destroy it.148
 Despite this seeming encouragement for zealous advocacy in the 
substantive law of some jurisdictions, the Model Rules pursue a dif-
ferent approach for lawyers advising organizational clients. Model 
Rule 1.13 explicitly, though perhaps confusingly, outlines steps that 
lawyers should take to protect entity clients from management mis-
conduct.149 The following Part considers how this rule and other pro-
fessional conduct rules fail to guide advisors in employing a skill set 
other than zealous advocacy.  
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Wagoner is a standing rule and in pari delicto is a defense); see also 3 RONALD E. MALLEN
& JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 22:4 (2009 ed.) (explaining application of in 
pari delicto and unclean hands doctrines as a defense against claims of attorney 
malpractice for advising the client to engage in or failing to dissuade a client from engaging 
in intentional misconduct).  
 147. Exceptions to both the Wagoner and in pari delicto doctrines should give the 
zealous advisor pause. In some jurisdictions, in pari delicto is interpreted literally to mean 
that the client must be at least “equally” at fault in order for the defense to apply. See, e.g.,
McKinley v. Weidner, 698 P.2d 983, 986 (Or. Ct. App. 1985). Also, like Wagoner, there is an 
adverse interest exception to the in pari delicto doctrine, allowing a cause of action when 
the agent preferred his own interests and acted adversely to the principal. See, e.g., Sender 
v. Mann, 423 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1174 (D. Colo. 2006). Likewise, under Wagoner, the client 
has standing to sue if the adverse interest exception applies (discussed in supra note 145 
and accompanying text) or if all of the company’s decisionmakers were not involved in the 
fraud. See Wechsler v. Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent & Sheinfeld, L.L.P., 212 B.R. 34, 36 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). If the latter exception were interpreted broadly, it would be consistent 
with the up the ladder reporting regime outlined in Model Rule 1.13(b), which arguably 
discourages zealous advocacy and encourages reporting serious concerns about possible 
legal liability to higher authorities in a company. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.13(b) (2009).  
 148. The applicability of the adverse interest exception to Wagoner is currently the 
basis of the trustee’s appeal in the Refco malpractice case against Mayer Brown. The 
Second Circuit certified eight questions regarding the adverse interest exception’s proper 
interpretation to the New York Court of Appeals. Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 590 F.3d 186, 
194-95 (2d Cir. 2009). The New York Court of Appeals accepted the certified questions but 
has not yet issued its opinion. Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 922 N.E.2d 898 (N.Y. 2010).  
 149. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b), (c) (2009); see also infra notes 160-
67, 170-85 and accompanying text (discussing the text of these rules and how it is 
interpreted by lawyers).  
2011] HARMING BUSINESS CLIENTS 275
III.   FAILINGS OF THE CURRENT PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULES TO 
GUIDE NONLITIGATORS IN ADVISING CLIENTS
 The concept of zealous advocacy is barely visible in today’s profes-
sional conduct rules.150 So it may seem illogical that professional con-
duct rules contribute to business lawyers relying upon zealous advo-
cacy. But there is reason to believe that is the case. While profession-
al conduct rules provide a great deal of direction to litigators about 
what conduct is required or prohibited in interactions with clients, 
courts, and third parties,151 such comprehensive, consistent guidance 
is not provided for nonlitigators. In this Part, I consider the failings 
of professional conduct rules to give direction to the lawyer-advisor 
and explain how this contributes to lawyers relying on traditional 
notions of zealous advocacy.  
A.   Scant Direction about How to Advise in the Advisor Rule 
 A single rule, Model Rule 2.1, explains the role of the advisor. It 
provides that the attorney should “exercise independent professional 
judgment and render candid advice.”152 The rule goes on to explain 
that attorneys can refer to nonlegal considerations in providing ad-
vice.153 Further, comments to the rule encourage attorneys to provide 
more than “technical” legal advice, such as when technical advice is 
inadequate because other nonlegal factors predominate or when the 
client is inexperienced in legal matters.154 Comment two mentions, 
almost in passing, that there can be a connection between ethics and 
law: “Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral and 
ethical considerations impinge upon most legal questions and may 
decisively influence how the law will be applied.”155 Another comment 
provides that even when advice is not requested, if a lawyer “knows” 
that the client proposes conduct “likely to result in substantial ad-
verse legal consequences to the client” then the lawyer “may” have an 
obligation to communicate advice.156
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 150. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.  
 151. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) (2009) (forbidding counsel 
from obstructing another party’s access to evidence or altering, destroying, or concealing a 
document with evidentiary value); id. at R. 3.4(b) (prohibiting, inter alia, counseling a wit-
ness to testify falsely); id. at R. 3.5(a) (attorney cannot seek to influence a judge or juror by 
a means prohibited by law); id. at R. 3.3(a)(1) (lawyers shall not make a false statement to 
the court); id. at R. 3.3(a)(4) (lawyer shall not offer false evidence). 
 152. Id. at R. 2.1.  
 153. Id. (“In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other 
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to 
the client’s situation.”).  
 154. Id. at R. 2.1 cmt. 2-3.  
 155. Id. at R. 2.1 cmt. 2 (emphasis added).  
 156. Id. at R. 2.1, cmt. 5. 
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 Model Rule 2.1 could be fairly characterized as imposing few real 
requirements.157 Moreover, the rule’s limited instructions may be 
counter-productive. By framing morality as a nonlegal consideration, 
lawyers may be less inclined to discuss the issues that sound like 
moral judgments, but actually have a bearing on issues of legal liabil-
ity.158 Further, consistent with this rule and comments, a client who 
requests technical legal advice will likely receive it,159 even when lia-
bility may arise despite technical compliance with some aspect of the 
law.  
 Some might argue that a competent lawyer would provide more 
than technical advice when necessary to fully inform the client of the 
risk of liability. And that is correct, but Model Rule 2.1 does nothing 
to encourage this approach. The rule does not provide any guidance 
as to how a competent lawyer should advise. The rule does nothing to 
encourage advisors to think beyond the narrow legal issue as pre-
sented or to appreciate their clients’ interest in understanding possi-
ble bases of liability.  
B.   Rules that Tell Attorneys When to Say No to Clients 
 There are a number of professional conduct rules that tell attor-
neys when to say “no” to conduct that will create liability for their 
clients. In theory, these rules could play a role in preventing the 
harm to clients discussed in this Article. This Part considers why the 
rules as currently written are unlikely to help in this regard.  
 Scattered throughout the rules of professional conduct, various 
provisions permit or require lawyers to refuse to participate in 
fraudulent conduct, criminal conduct, violations of law, or various 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 157. See John Steele, DOJ Report on Torture Is Finally Out, LEGAL ETHICS FORUM 
(Feb. 19. 2010, 8:39 PM), http://www.legalethicsforum.com/blog/2010/02/doj-report-on-
torture-memos-is-finally-out.html (commenting on the difficulty of disciplining a lawyer-
author of the torture memos for violating a state version of Model Rule 2.1 if the lawyer’s 
advice was based on truly held beliefs, but noting that one could discipline the lawyer 
under a state version of Model Rule 1.1 if the lawyer acted incompetently in providing the 
advice); Brad Wendel, The Ethics of Advising: Are We All Formalists Now?, LEGAL ETHICS
FORUM (Feb. 20, 2010, 11:32 AM), http://www.legalethicsforum.com/blog/2010/02/the-
ethics-of-advising-are-we-all-formalists-now.html [hereinafter Wendel, Ethics of Advising]
(noting that Model Rule 2.1 “doesn’t say much” but arguing that discipline should be 
appropriate for a lawyer whose advice is objectively wrong).  
 158. See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text (discussing results of lack of moral-
sounding advice). But see supra note 155 and accompanying text (quoting a portion of 
comment 2 to Model Rule 2.1 which acknowledges that moral issues may impact how the 
law will be applied). Despite this light encouragement for moral-sounding advice in the 
comment, a lawyer is more likely to consider the text of the rule which merely mentions 
that a lawyer “may” refer to moral considerations.  
 159. See supra notes 38-50, 65-71, and accompanying text (discussing examples of the 
negative implications of technical advice).  
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other forms of illegal client conduct.160 Attorneys view the rules skep-
tically, though, perhaps because the rules seem to describe something 
that is contrary to the client’s interest.161 Indeed, some of the rules 
are written for the purpose of protecting the attorney from liability 
and not for the purpose of describing the lawyer’s duties to clients.162
The view that the rules are against the client’s interest is likely fur-
ther cemented by the fact that the rules require that the lawyer have 
a high level of certainty that the conduct is fraudulent, criminal, a 
violation of law, and so forth, before any obligation to say “no”  
arises.163
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 160. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2009) (“If a lawyer for an 
organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated with the 
organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the 
representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of 
law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in 
substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably 
necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably believes 
that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall 
refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the 
circumstances to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as 
determined by applicable law.” (emphasis added)); id. at R. 1.13(c) (“Except as provided in 
paragraph (d), if (1) despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the 
highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address 
in a timely and appropriate manner an action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation 
of law, and (2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to 
result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal information
relating to the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if 
and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to 
the organization.” (emphasis added)); id. at R. 1.16(a)(1) (“[A] lawyer shall not represent a 
client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of 
a client if: (1) the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct 
or other law . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. at R. 1.16(b) (“[A] lawyer may withdraw from 
representing a client if: . . . (2) the client persists in a course of action involving the 
lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent; (3) the client 
has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. at 
R. 1.2(d) (“A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that 
the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal 
consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a 
client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of 
the law.” (emphasis added)). 
 161. See id. 
 162. See Green, Criminal Regulation, supra note 30, at 347-48 (explaining that “[i]n 
response to concern about lawyers’ potential criminal liability,” provisions of the lawyer 
professional responsibility codes encourage or at least make it possible for lawyers to 
comply with criminal laws that are likely to bear on their professional conduct and citing 
Model Rule 1.16(a)(1) (1995) as an example of such a provision); id. at 349 (asserting that 
Model Rule 1.16’s provisions permitting withdrawal when the client persists in a course of 
conduct that the lawyer “reasonably believes is criminal” or fraudulent is a rule that 
“authorize[s] lawyers to avoid assisting . . . a client’s criminal conduct, even at the expense 
of the client’s interests.” (emphasis added)); Fred C. Zacharias, The Images of Lawyers, 20 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 73, 81 (2007) [hereinafter Zacharias, Images] (explaining that other 
rules have an image of a lawyer as an independent, objective monitor of the legal system 
who can “express moral and political beliefs to clients,” protect third parties, and 
“withdraw from representation[s] that [are] repugnant to them”).  
 163. See text of rules cited in supra note 160. 
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 Brimming with subjective standards, these rules are like food to 
zealous advocates.164 Professor Susan Koniak explains transactional 
lawyers’ inability to “know” fraud as a “product of the litigation men-
tality.”165 Professor Koniak notes that even though a lawyer would be 
able to identify fraud that others are perpetrating, a lawyer’s mind-
set is to make any plausible argument that his or her own client’s 
conduct is not fraudulent.166 She concludes that this mindset is justi-
fiable in litigation, but is misused to “free[] corporate clients from the 
law that would constrain them.”167
 There are two things that the zealous advocate misses with this 
analysis. First, the rules presume that the lawyer has already compe-
tently advised the client about the prospect of liability and that the 
client has knowingly chosen the ill-advised course of conduct. But as 
discussed in the foregoing Parts, if the client does not receive advice 
about the prospect of legal liability (rather than zealous advocacy) 
then the client is not making an educated, informed choice to engage 
in the liability-creating conduct.168 Reading the “when to say no” 
rules (like Model Rule 1.16) narrowly may be acceptable as long as 
the lawyer has appropriately advised the client about the risks of lia-
bility,169 something that likely has not happened if the lawyer is act-
ing as a zealous advocate.  
 Second, all rules are not created with the same purpose. While 
some of the “when to say no” rules are contrary to the autonomous 
client’s interests, one of the rules is written with the purpose of tell-
ing lawyers how to protect their clients.170 Model Rule 1.13—the Or-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 164. See Kim, Banality of Fraud, supra note 19, at 1049 (explaining that “complex and 
ambiguous” questions such as those found in Model Rule 1.13 “can serve as a fertile 
breeding ground for motivated reasoning”—reasoning that is motivated by a desired 
outcome). Kim hypothesizes that what is motivating the reasoning is the lawyer’s self-
interest, see id., but I posit that another motivating factor is the lawyer’s perception that 
his or her role is to advocate the client’s desires.  
 165. Koniak, Corporate Fraud, supra note 41, at 212-13.  
 166. Id. at 213.  
 167. Id. at 214; see also Kim, Banality of Fraud, supra note 19, at 1052 (describing the 
post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act amendments to Model Rule 1.13 as including “confusing or high 
triggering standards, . . . copious qualifications, and . . . cautionary language, as well as 
[no] coherent theory of a co-agent’s authority, [which] make it difficult for any lawyer to be 
confident in her decisions to report up the ladder or report out . . . ”). 
 168. See also Longan, supra note 71, at 671 (describing the client’s interest in learning 
from its attorney when conduct may result in legal liability).  
 169. The other wrinkle is that a narrow reading may be against the interest of the 
lawyer, who might be interested in knowing that he or she is subjecting himself or herself 
to liability for failing to withdraw rather than participate in fraudulent conduct. Though it 
is beyond the scope of this Article, there would be value in revising Model Rules 1.16 and 
1.2(d) to clarify the purpose of the rules and to consistently describe the level of certainty 
and the type of illegality (fraud, crime, breach of fiduciary duty, etc.) that should cause a 
lawyer to withdraw, refuse a representation, or refuse to provide advice.  
 170. See Kim, Banality of Fraud, supra note 19, at 1047-48, 1052 (noting the confusing 
incongruity between Model Rules 1.6 and 1.13 and explaining that Model Rule 1.6 is 
drafted from the perspective of the individual client who has no interest in adverse 
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ganization as Client Rule—is drafted to describe the steps attorneys 
must take to protect an organizational client from an agent’s liabil-
ity-creating conduct.171 The rule provides that counsel must act in the 
client’s “best interest[s]” when company constituents are planning or 
are engaged in “a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or 
a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organiza-
tion,” but only if the conduct is “likely to result in substantial injury 
to the organization.”172 Acting in the company’s best interest is de-
scribed as ordinarily requiring counsel to take concerns “up the lad-
der” to higher authorities in the company.173 When up the ladder re-
porting does not work to address the misconduct, subsection (c) of the 
rule permits the lawyer to report confidential information outside of 
the company if doing so will protect the organization from substantial 
injury caused by constituent conduct that is “clearly a violation of 
law,” but only if “the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is 
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the organization” 
and the lawyer “reasonably believes” disclosure is “necessary to pre-
vent substantial injury to the organization.”174
 Despite considerable evidence that these provisions of Model Rule 
1.13 were intended to guide attorneys in protecting their organiza-
tional clients from legal liability,175 many attorneys have argued 
against the rule (and a similar SEC rule) as contrary to the obliga-
tion of zealous advocacy.176 Attorney skepticism that the rule is in the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
disclosure, which is confusing when contrasted to Model Rule 1.13 or when Model Rule 1.6 
is applied to organizational clients); Zacharias, Images, supra note 162, at 75-85 
(explaining that professional conduct rule drafters have different images of lawyers in 
mind when they draft rules, and that the “most commonly relied upon, and [the] most 
heartily defended” is the image of lawyers as client protectors which lies at the core of the 
client-centered rules).  
 171. See Robert B. Robbins, Ethics and Professional Responsibility for Attorneys in 
Securities Transactions, ALI-ABA Course of Study 489, 493 (2009) (“The premise of Model 
Rule 1.13 is that, when a lawyer represents an organization. . . , the lawyer owes the 
organization a duty of protection from harm.”); Paula Schaefer, Overcoming Noneconomic 
Barriers to Loyal Disclosure, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 417, 435-68 (2007) (explaining that the 
purpose of Model Rule 1.13 is to allow attorneys to protect organizational clients from 
constituent misconduct, including the ability to disclose confidences when doing so will 
protect the organization). 
 172. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2009).  
 173. Id. at R. 1.13(c). 
 174. Id.
 175. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.  
 176. See Herrick K. Lidstone, Jr., Am I My Brother’s Keeper? Redefining the Attorney-
Client Relationship, COLO. LAW., Apr. 2003, at 11, 14 (quoting Pfizer general counsel 
Jeffrey Kindler as arguing that the attorney conduct provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
“wrongly put[] corporate attorneys in the role of judge rather than advocate.” (emphasis 
added)); Christin M. Stephens, Comment, Sarbanes-Oxley and Regulation of Lawyers’ 
Conduct: Pushing the Boundaries of the Duty of Confidentiality, 24 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 271, 296 (2005) (asserting that the most frequently stated objection to such a 
disclosure rule is that it “would harm the attorney’s ability to zealously represent the 
client”); Symposium, Lessons from Enron: A Symposium on Corporate Governance, 54 
MERCER L. REV. 683, 710 (2003) (comments of Bill Ide) (Former American Bar Association 
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client’s interest is understandable. This is the only rule that requires 
an attorney to believe that the client is interested in avoiding legal 
liability and that the attorney should protect the client from liabil-
ity.177 The professional conduct rules do not provide clear signposts 
for lawyers, alerting them of the purpose of each rule.178 As a result, 
lawyers likely read all of the “when to say no” professional conduct 
rules consistently—always viewing the client’s interest as pushing 
the limits of the law and the lawyer’s role as avoiding the rule’s limi-
tations if possible.179
 A zealous advocate who believes Model Rule 1.13 is contrary to his 
or her client’s interests would have little trouble justifying doing 
nothing to protect the client. The rule is complex180 and includes nu-
merous subjective, and perhaps ambiguous, standards that the law-
yer must satisfy before taking action.181 Some have interpreted the 
rule as requiring lawyers to do nothing if the agent’s misconduct will 
benefit the client or if the lawyer’s disclosure would reveal the other-
wise hidden misconduct, thus harming the client.182 Implicit in these 
interpretations is a concern that disclosure to someone cannot protect
the organizational client. Others read the rule’s “violation of law” 
language narrowly to address only violations of statutes and regula-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
President Bill Ide stated, “Some of us have a strong concern that if you erode the [attorney-
client] privilege too far, we will turn lawyers into auditors. . . . The result would be 
destruction of a critical component of our justice system–the lawyer as an advocate.”). 
 177. See Zacharias, Images, supra note 162, at 87-88 (explaining that when 
professional conduct rules are written from different paradigms, the result can be to 
“undermine lawyers’ understanding of what role truly governs their practice”).  
 178. See id.
 179. See also Simon, Confidentiality, supra note 39, at 1454 (arguing that even though 
lawyers understand that organizational clients are different from their managers, the Bar 
has given them no other “clear conception” of the organizational client’s identity and 
interests, so “in spite of themselves, lawyers instinctively fall back on views that conflate 
the organization and its personnel”).  
 180. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2009); see supra note 160 for full 
text of sections (b) and (c) of Model Rule 1.13; see also infra note 244 and accompanying 
text (describing other subjects of the rule). 
 181. For example, to make a disclosure to protect the client, the rule directs an attorney 
to determine that the conduct is “clearly a violation of law,” that the highest authority’s 
response was not appropriate, that the attorney “reasonably believes” that the clear violation 
is “reasonably certain to result in substantial injury” and that the lawyer “reasonably 
believes” that disclosure is “necessary” to prevent substantial injury to the organization.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c); see also Cramton, Organizational Clients, supra
note 46, at 1051 (arguing that Model Rule 1.13’s ambiguous terms, including “clearly,” 
“certain,” and “necessary” create unnecessary interpretive problems). 
 182. See Monroe H. Freedman, The “Corporate Watch Dogs” That Can’t Bark: How the 
New ABA Ethical Rules Protect Corporate Fraud, 8 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 225, 231 (2004) 
(arguing that the lawyer’s disclosure of misconduct would cause substantial injury to the 
client); David McGowan, Why Not Try the Carrot? A Modest Proposal to Grant Immunity to 
Lawyers Who Disclose Client Financial Misconduct, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1825, 1830 (2004) 
(explaining that lawyers might reason that allowing a fraud to continue might benefit the 
company, and that disclosure of it might ultimately harm the company). 
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tions, but not common forms of business misconduct like fraud.183
These interpretations are consistent with zealous advocacy,184 but 
they are inconsistent with the rule’s intent and the organizational 
client’s interests.185
IV.   IN SEARCH OF A NEW TOUCHSTONE: FIDUCIARY DUTY 
TO THE CLIENT
 Acknowledging the role zealous advocacy can play for business 
lawyers complicates common conceptions of why lawyers facilitate 
business misconduct. Many assume that a lack of morality explains 
lawyers’ (and managers’) involvement in business scandals.186 Others 
argue that business lawyers are rational actors who make calculated 
decisions that the possible rewards of misconduct outweigh the 
risks.187 But most lawyers (including the lawyers discussed in this 
Article) are more complex than a simple label like “unethical” or “ra-
tional economic actor” portrays.188 They may be influenced in part by 
their personal ethics or by a conscious cost-benefit analysis, but also 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 183. See Simon, Confidentiality, supra note 39, at 1465 (asserting that attorneys read 
the provisions of Model Rule 1.13 concerning misconduct by managers as meaning “either 
breach of criminal or regulatory law on the one hand or explicit conflict of interest 
situations on the other,” leaving unchecked “a range of decisions that were potentially 
breaches of fiduciary duty but not violations of specific legal commands or  
explicit conflicts”).  
 184. See Kimberly Kirkland, Ethics in Large Law Firms: The Principle of Pragmatism,
35 U. MEM. L. REV. 631, 717 (2005) (“[L]awyers have elevated the duty to zealously 
represent their clients over other competing obligations, and the procedural and ethical 
rules that constrain lawyers’ conduct are just another set of rules to be gamed, interpreted, 
and argued in the effort to advance the client’s interests.”). 
 185. Schaefer, supra note 171, at 435-68 (explaining that attorneys will not act as 
permitted by Model Rule 1.13(c) even when appropriate to protect the client because of a 
belief that disclosure is not in the client’s interest and based on their interpretations of the 
language of the rule). 
 186. See Leonard Bucklin, More Preaching, Fewer Rules: A Process for the Corporate 
Lawyer’s Maintenance of Corporate Ethics, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 887, 888 (2009) (arguing 
that corporate attorneys “should rely less on rules and more on open and earnest advocacy 
of moral values”); Langevoort, supra note 33, at 77 (asserting that many people believe 
attorney complicity in corporate misconduct can be attributed to “greed and  
moral corruption”).  
 187. See Kim, Gatekeepers, supra note 33, at 418 (asserting that gatekeeping theory 
has adopted the “rational choice theory” (RCT) as its model for expected human behavior 
and explaining that RCT assumes that lawyers (and other gatekeepers) are rational actors 
who will act in accordance with whether the gains of corruption or acquiescence outweigh 
the expected costs).  
 188. Id. at 419 (explaining that a behavioral realist approach “calls forth on the law to 
adopt the most accurate model of human decisionmaking and behavior,” and that the 
behavioral realist considers “insights from modern social psychology: that the situation is a 
better predictor of human behavior than an individual’s personal characteristics or views”); 
Langevoort, supra note 33, at 79 (“While moral dispositions do vary, situations are apt to 
have an even greater influence on behavior . . . .”).   
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by a myriad of other factors, including a belief that their role is to be 
a zealous advocate.189
 Because many factors contribute to how lawyers represent their 
business clients, I acknowledge that a shift in thinking away from 
zealous advocacy is not a panacea. Nonetheless, adopting a new 
touchstone that is more consistent with a nonlitigation client’s inter-
ests could contribute to better legal advice. And because “zealous ad-
vocate” is a consciously held bias of many lawyers, the profession is 
capable of making a conscious shift to something better.190
 It is against this backdrop that I propose a new touchstone for the 
legal profession: fiduciary duty to the client. This Part considers the 
advantage of this approach, the most significant being that the 
framework remains client-centered, but jettisons zealous advocacy’s 
harmful baggage. The primary disadvantage of fiduciary duty is that 
all attorneys may not readily grasp what it means as an analytical 
framework. This Part concludes by explaining how that disadvantage 
may lead to an opportunity for professional conduct rule makers.  
A.   Defining the Fiduciary Duty Touchstone 
 While there are various ways to describe the attorney-fiduciary’s 
obligations,191 it may be simplest to organize the duties in two cate-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 189. See generally supra notes 14-26 and accompanying text (discussing lawyer’s 
conscious understanding that lawyers are to act as zealous advocates). 
 190. See Kim, Banality of Fraud, supra note 19, at 1008 (“Lawyers can be 
professionally molded to accommodate various conceptions of lawyering, with some 
conceptions creating greater alignment pressures toward clients than others.”); Robertson, 
supra note 33, at 43-47 (arguing that there are steps that can be taken to facilitate “a more 
salient professional identity” (i.e., understanding the lawyer’s role as providing 
independent legal advice) for attorneys, including focusing time on the role, making 
connections with others committed to the same role, and consciously taking a skeptical 
approach to one’s own legal advice). Professor Robertson asserts that “debiasing 
strategies,” such as education, are not particularly effective in combating attorneys’ 
unconscious partisan biases. Id. at 34. But if the zealous advocacy mindset is a conscious 
bias, as I assert in this Article, it could be combated by reeducating business lawyers 
through efforts such as revising the professional conduct rules.    
 191. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 (2000) (“To 
the extent consistent with the lawyer’s other legal duties . . . a lawyer must, in matters 
within the scope of the representation: (1) proceed in a manner reasonably calculated to 
advance a client’s lawful objectives, as defined by the client after consultation; (2) act with 
reasonable competence and diligence; (3) comply with obligations concerning the client’s 
confidences and property, avoid impermissible conflicting interests, deal honestly with the 
client, and not employ advantages arising from the client-lawyer relationship in a manner 
adverse to the client; and (4) fulfill valid contractual obligations to the client.”); id. § 16 
cmt. b (“Rationale. A lawyer is a fiduciary, that is, a person to whom another person’s 
affairs are entrusted in circumstances that often make it difficult or undesirable for that 
other person to supervise closely the performance of a fiduciary. Assurances of the lawyer’s 
competence, diligence, and loyalty are therefore vital.” (emphasis added)); MARTYN & FOX,
supra note 68, at 57 (describing the five C’s of attorney fiduciary duty: “client control 
concerning the goals of the representation, communication, competence, confidentiality, 
and conflict of interest resolution”); see also infra note 226 and accompanying text 
(explaining the appeal of describing all attorney duties as “fiduciary duties”).  
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gories: (1) a duty of care and (2) a duty of loyalty. The duty of care is 
generally described as encompassing the obligation to act as a compe-
tent, diligent attorney.192 The duty of loyalty requires the attorney to 
put the client’s interests first, including keeping the client’s confi-
dences, avoiding conflicts of interest, not employing advantages aris-
ing from the relationship to harm the client, and dealing with the 
client honestly and in good faith.193
 Fiduciary duty provides a better answer to the key question posed 
by this Article: How should lawyers advise their clients about the po-
tential for legal liability? Zealous advocacy views “illegal” as a line 
that cannot be crossed but otherwise endorses lawyers zealously ad-
vocating their clients’ plans. Fiduciary duty provides the framework 
for a different approach.194 Fiduciary duty views the issue as this: 
How should a competent attorney advise her client about the poten-
tial for legal liability?195 The answer is that competent lawyers must 
provide guidance not only about black and white violations of law but 
also fully explain the risks of legal liability for a client’s desired 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 192. The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers provides that a lawyer has 
liability for professional negligence if the lawyer breaches the duty of care to the client. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 50 (2000) (“For purposes of 
liability under § 48 [Professional Negligence], a lawyer owes a client the duty to exercise 
care within the meaning of § 52 in pursuing the client’s lawful objectives in matters 
covered by the representation.”). Section 52 provides that for purposes of establishing 
professional negligence, the “lawyer who owes a duty of care must exercise the competence 
and diligence normally exercised by lawyers in similar circumstances.” Id. § 52; see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 8.08 (2006) (providing in part that “[i]f an 
agent claims to possess special skills or knowledge, the agent has a duty to the principal to 
act with the care, competence, and diligence normally exercised by agents with such skills 
or knowledge”).  
 193. The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers states that a lawyer has liability 
for breach of fiduciary duty if the lawyer breaches one of the duties listed in § 16(3). 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49 (2000). The § 16(3) duties 
are to “comply with obligations concerning the client’s confidences and property, avoid 
impermissible conflicting interests, deal honestly with the client, and not employ 
advantages arising from the client-lawyer relationship in a manner adverse to the client.” 
Id. § 16(3); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 8.02-8.06 (describing 
the duty of loyalty as encompassing the duty not to take a material benefit arising from the 
relationship, not to act as or on behalf of an adverse party, not to compete, and not to use 
the principal’s property or confidences, absent principal consent).  
 194. See Wendel, Ethics of Advising, supra note 157 (arguing that lawyer conduct rules 
should be interpreted as consistent with the broader law governing lawyers, including case 
law holding that lawyer-advisors have liability for failing to act objectively in the best 
interests of their clients).  
 195. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 94 (2000) (stating 
that lawyers who counsel or assist clients “to engage in conduct that violates the rights of a 
third person [are] subject to liability” to the clients to the extent that doing so violates the 
duty to exercise competence and diligence normally exercised by lawyers in similar 
circumstances.). Unfortunately, the Restatement does not explain how a competent, 
diligent lawyer advises but only that there is liability if the lawyer does not provide 
competent, diligent advice and the client is thereby damaged. Id.; see also supra note 157 
(citing authorities for the proposition that the advisor rule, Model Rule 2.1, provides less 
guidance to advisors than the competence rule, Model Rule 1.1).  
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course of conduct.196 The uncertainty of legal liability does not dimin-
ish the fact that the client is paying for and is owed professional 
guidance.197
 Competently providing guidance about the potential for liability 
does not detract from client autonomy. In most cases, a client is al-
lowed to make a bad choice, even one that will create legal liability.198
But that does not mean that the client’s lawyer must participate in 
the misconduct. Lawyers have the choice (and sometimes the obliga-
tion) to withdraw rather than participate in client misconduct.199
Zealous advocacy exacerbates the conflict between client will and the 
attorney’s withdrawal dilemma; fiduciary duty, though, could lessen 
it. A lawyer who views herself as a zealous advocate of the client’s 
agenda will not dissuade the client of questionable conduct—she will 
instead find an argument to support the client’s desires. That attor-
ney will be more likely to encounter situations where she must decide 
whether to participate in legally questionable conduct. If instead the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 196. See, e.g., Beverly Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz & Schatz, Ribicoff & Kotkin, 717 
A.2d 724, 728-29 (Conn. 1998) (defendant lawyers did not dispute on appeal that they were 
negligent in failing to advise client that it was violating Connecticut law and instead 
advising client that its conduct was in a “gray area” of the law); Bellino v. McGrath North 
Mullin & Kratz, PC LLO, 738 N.W.2d 434, 445-47 (Neb. 2007) (client stated a claim for 
malpractice when he alleged that attorneys failed to advise him that he could be liable for 
breach of fiduciary duty if he engaged in his planned conduct); Plymouth Org., Inc. v. 
Silverman, Collura & Chernis, P.C., 799 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (plaintiff 
stated a cause of action for malpractice by alleging that it was damaged by lawyers’ failure 
to advise it that “finders” it hired must be licensed brokers and by failing to explain other 
potential improprieties in using the finders to solicit investors, which resulted in the 
plaintiff receiving from various states letters ordering it to “cease and desist sales, 
questioning the legality of the investment offering, and commencing investigations”); see 
also infra note 202 (listing cases in which lawyers had liability for failing to competently 
advise their business organization clients).  
 197. Though some courts have prohibited malpractice claims to proceed against 
lawyers who failed to warn clients of potential liability, those cases are—perhaps 
surprisingly—consistent with my assertions about the fiduciary duties of advisors. 
Malpractice claims are barred in this context not because the lawyers competently advised 
their clients, but because the client engaged in the misconduct the lawyer failed to advise 
against. See, e.g., Blain v. Doctor’s Co., 272 Cal. Rptr. 250, 253-55 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) 
(doctrine of unclean hands precludes physician’s legal malpractice claim against his lawyer 
who advised the physician to lie in a deposition); Stratton v. Miller, 113 B.R. 205 (D. Md. 
1989), aff’d, 900 F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 1990) and 900 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1990) (law firm failed 
to inform board of president’s fraud, but contributory negligence and doctrine of in pari 
delicto prohibited company’s bankruptcy trustee from bringing the claim); see also MALLEN
& SMITH, supra note 146, § 22:4 (“Although the correctness of attorney’s advice concerning 
a course of action does not depend on the client’s motives, those motives may invoke policy 
considerations about whether the attorney should be liable for negligent advice.”). The 
availability of a defense to a malpractice claim based on negligent advice does not detract 
from the lawyer’s obligation to competently advise clients about potential for liability.  
 198. See Zacharias, Images, supra note 162, at 87 (explaining that an essential 
assumption of lawyer conduct rules is that client autonomy is important and the lawyer’s 
role is to enhance client autonomy). But see infra notes 200-202 and accompanying text 
(explaining that for entity clients, the lawyer’s fiduciary duties of loyalty and care require 
the lawyer to protect the client from liability). 
 199. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a), (b) (2009).  
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attorney’s focus is on competently advising a client about the risks of 
legal liability, clients will retain their autonomy and be better 
equipped to make decisions. The result of more information might be 
less risk-taking and fewer situations where lawyers must decide 
whether they should withdraw.  
 For the organizational client, there is an additional wrinkle that is 
also answered by fiduciary duty. The attorney’s loyalty and care are 
owed to the organization itself, not the company’s managers.200 These 
obligations have been interpreted to require lawyers to advise 
against liability-creating conduct and take other affirmative steps to 
protect the company from liability.201 Attorney-advisors have faced 
liability for failing to fulfill these duties.202 The organization’s attor-
ney’s fiduciary obligations in this regard are already embodied in 
Model Rule 1.13,203 a rule that (as previously discussed) has been re-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 200. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(1) (2000).  
 201. See id. § 96(2) (explaining that additional steps must be taken in “the best 
interests of the organization” if constituents are engaged in conduct that will cause 
substantial injury to the organization); Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr. & Eugene R. Gaetke, 
The Ethical Obligation of Transactional Lawyers to Act as Gatekeepers, 56 RUTGERS L.
REV. 9, 23 (2003) (“[T]he lawyer’s loyalty to the entity client logically mandates some action 
to protect it from the harm occurring through or threatened by the constituent’s actions.”). 
Liability in this context has been interpreted to encompass the agent’s liability to the 
organization (i.e., agent breached a duty to the organization) and agent conduct that 
creates liability for the organization (i.e., organization is held responsible for agent 
misconduct); Cramton et al., supra note 66, at 737 (“[A]s part of the duties of care, 
competence and diligence that an organization’s lawyer owes to the organization, the 
lawyer is required to exercise reasonable care to prevent an organization’s constituent from 
violating a legal obligation to the organization or causing harm to the organization by 
performing acts on behalf of the organization that will cause injury to it, such as by 
exposing the organization to criminal or civil liability.”).  
 202. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Clark, 978 F.2d 1541, 1545-46 (10th Cir. 1992) 
(affirming a jury’s verdict that bank’s attorneys were negligent based on evidence that 
attorneys did not fully investigate and report to the board of directors allegations of 
fraudulent activities by bank officers); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. O’Melveny & Meyers, 969 
F.2d 744, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the duty of care to the client includes 
“protect[ing] the client from the liability which may flow from promulgating a false or 
misleading offering to investors”), rev’d on other grounds, 512 U.S. 79 (1994), on remand,
61 F.3d 17 (9th Cir. 1995); In re Fuzion Tech. Grp., Inc. 332 B.R. 225, 229 (S.D. Fla. 2005) 
(allowing a claim to proceed against outside counsel who failed to bring facts to the 
attention of the board that would have revealed the CEO-Chairman’s misappropriation of 
millions of dollars); In re Am. Cont’l Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 
1424, 1453 (D. Ariz. 1992) (allowing a cause of action against attorneys who allegedly failed 
to take steps to prevent corporation’s regulatory violations); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Nat’l 
Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 713 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding that an attorney’s duty 
to the corporate client obligated attorneys to take action to interfere with the 
consummation of a merger of corporations when attorneys knew that financial statements 
relied upon by shareholders in the merger were inaccurate); see also Longan, supra note 
71, at 671 (explaining that even though a lawyer’s fidelity to law may seem inconsistent 
with the client’s interest when the client wants to engage in fraudulent conduct, it is 
actually in the client’s interest for the lawyer to advise against and refuse to help the client 
engage in fraudulent conduct). 
 203. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2009) (organization is the client); id.
at R. 1.13(b) (lawyer has an up the ladder reporting obligation); id. at R. 1.13(c) (lawyer 
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sisted and misunderstood by zealous advocates.204 The challenge is 
rewriting the rule for clarity so that lawyers understand that protect-
ing the organizational client from liability is consistent with a client-
centered representation.  
B.   Benefits of Fiduciary Duty over Zealous Advocacy as Professional 
Decisionmaking Touchstone 
 While other frameworks for understanding the lawyer’s role may 
be workable,205 fiduciary duty has the advantage of being consistent 
with existing law. Lawyers are fiduciaries.206 It is sensible for this 
broad legal obligation to be in the forefront of attorneys’ minds as 
they make decisions about how to advise their clients207 and to be 
embodied in the professional conduct rules where lawyers may turn 
for guidance.208 But even if fiduciary duty is never incorporated into a 
single state’s professional conduct rules, there is no harm in attor-
neys adopting fiduciary duty as their personal professional mantra. 
It is entirely consistent with their legal obligations.  
 A positive aspect of the touchstone shift is that fiduciary duty al-
ready has much in common with zealous advocacy: both frameworks 
require lawyers to make decisions in the interests of their own cli-
ents. 209 Proponents of zealous advocacy’s client-centered focus should 
be equally willing to embrace fiduciary duty as a guiding principle. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
has an obligation to disclose agent misconduct to protect the organizational client); see also 
supra note 171 and accompanying text.  
 204. See supra notes 160-67, 176-85 and accompanying text.  
 205. Some have questioned whether characterization of the relationship as an agency 
one remains accurate for attorneys and their corporate clients. See David B. Wilkins, Team 
of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney/Client Relationship 673-74 (Dec. 
2, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1517342. Though there is logic in a reconceptualization 
of the relationship, I believe that attorneys can continue to view themselves as agents but 
better serve their corporate clients by embracing the fact that the entity has an interest in 
avoiding legal liability, and the attorney—as agent—is obligated to protect the entity client 
from that liability. See supra notes 200-202 and accompanying text.  
 206. The U.S. Supreme Court agrees that a lawyer, as the client’s agent, is “duty-bound 
to act only in the interests of the principal.” Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426, 436 (2005). 
Fiduciary duty arises from this agency relationship and is consistent with the Court’s view of 
the lawyer-client relationship as an agency one. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.  
 207. See Wendel, Ethics of Advising, supra note 157 (arguing that lawyer conduct rules 
should be interpreted consistent with other sources of law). 
 208. Charles E. Rounds, Jr., Lawyer Codes are Just about Licensure, the Lawyer’s 
Relationship with the State: Recalling the Common Law Agency, Contract, Tort, Trust, and 
Property Principles that Regulate the Lawyer-Client Fiduciary Relationship, 60 BAYLOR L.
REV. 771, 775-76 (2008) (opining that law students, lawyers, and jurists may look primarily 
to professional conduct rules rather than other sources of law governing the attorney- 
client relationship).  
 209. See Bernstein, supra note 19, at 1169 (arguing that zealous advocacy is “up there 
in the professional-responsibility pantheon next to loyalty and competence”); see also
Zacharias, Images, supra note 162, at 80 (describing the paradigm of “lawyers as client 
protectors” as the “most commonly relied upon and most heartily defended” paradigm for 
client-centered professional conduct rules).  
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Further, fiduciary duty is less complicated and provides more pre-
dictable results than regimes that expect lawyers to balance the 
competing needs of the legal system, third parties, and the courts.210
Fiduciary duty tells the lawyer to focus on the client’s interests (em-
phasizing the client’s interest in understanding the prospect of liabil-
ity) and leaves it to other provisions of the professional conduct rules 
or other sources of law to define when other interests may or  
must prevail.211
 The benefit of fiduciary duty over zealous advocacy as a touch-
stone, though, is that fiduciary duty captures the complexity of what 
it means to act in the client’s interest. Fiduciary duty requires a law-
yer to ask whether a competent, loyal lawyer would encourage a 
course of conduct likely to create legal liability for the client. Put an-
other way, it requires a lawyer to provide legal advice—the thing the 
lawyer was presumably hired to provide—rather than to argue pas-
sionately for the client’s desires.212
 Fiduciary duty also addresses the need for a gap filler or default 
rule. For many attorneys, “zealous advocacy” is their current gap fill-
er: if something is not prohibited by ethics rules or other sources of 
law, they zealously advocate their client’s wishes. Some jurisdictions 
have tried to eliminate offensive, abusive lawyer tactics by removing 
the term “zeal” from professional conduct rules.213 For example, Ari-
zona removed all references to zeal in its rules and added rules that 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 210. See Nestor M. Davidson, Values and Value Creation in Public-Private 
Transactions, 94 IOWA L. REV. 937, 974 (2009) (describing the tension between zealous 
advocacy “and alternative visions of attorney identity that would impose independent 
ethical or moral duties beyond client goals”); Gordon, Citizen Lawyer, supra note 1, at 1169 
(describing the citizen lawyer as one “who acts in a significant part of his or her 
professional life with some plausible vision of the public good and the general welfare in 
mind”); Wendel, Butlers, supra note 23, at 162 (explaining the view that lawyers have an 
obligation to practice “whole law,” which would require lawyer to avoid loopholes and 
consider whether the lawyer’s actions are in the public’s interest and promote justice). 
 211. For example, under Model Rule 1.6(b), a lawyer could reveal confidential 
information to protect a third party (or the lawyer) even though the client may prefer the 
information be kept in confidence. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2009). 
Similarly, under Model Rule 4.4(b), the lawyer must give notice to an opponent of an 
inadvertent disclosure, though the client may prefer the opponent’s mistake not be 
revealed. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2009).  
 212. See Paula A. Monopoli, Teaching Lawyers to be More than Zealous Advocates, 2001 
WIS. L. REV. 1159, 1164 (2001) (arguing that legal education has failed to make fiduciary 
duty the primary focus and has instead focused almost exclusively on the role of lawyers as 
zealous advocates).  
 213. See David D. Dodge, When Lawyers Behave Badly: The “Z” Word, Civility & the 
Ethical Rules, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Apr. 2008, at 18, 19 & n.2 (noting that Arizona, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, and Washington have no references to 
zeal in their professional conduct rules, preambles, and commentary); see also Arthur J. 
Lachman & Peter R. Jarvis, Zeal in Client Representation – FAQs, 2005 PROF. LAW. 81, 83-
84 (2005) (ten states’ rules have no reference to zeal).  
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prohibit “unprofessional conduct.”214 While Arizona’s revision may 
take away the excuse for boorish behavior, it does not address the 
zealous advocacy problem described in this Article. Fiduciary duty 
can be the new governing principle that fills the void.  
 Finally, terminology is important. Some zeal proponents argue 
that supplanting “zealous advocacy” is merely a linguistic ploy.215
Others attempt to attribute complex traits to the phrase.216 Professor 
Anita Bernstein argues that attorney misconduct “may look zealous,” 
but if it harms the client it is improper because it violates the attor-
ney’s fiduciary duty to the client.217 Of course, I agree with Professor 
Bernstein that such conduct violates fiduciary duties, but I believe 
the simplistic zealous advocacy mantra bears a measure of the 
blame. Significantly, even if Professor Bernstein and I agree to disa-
gree on the terminology, we have identified the same problem: attor-
neys are not living up to their fiduciary duties when they harm cli-
ents. The solution to either articulation of the problem is the same—
the profession must provide lawyers with a better understanding of 
how to competently, loyally represent their clients.  
C.   Challenges of Making Fiduciary Duty a Touchstone for  
Professional Decisionmaking 
 A major challenge of my suggested mantra shift is that “fiduciary 
duty” is not as easily accessible as “zealous advocacy.” Zealous advo-
cacy’s great advantage is that it is simple.218 It is easy to remember 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 214. See Dodge, supra note 213, at 19-20 (describing Arizona’s elimination of all 
references to zeal and its new Rules 31, 41, and 53 which define unprofessional conduct, 
require attorneys to avoid unprofessional conduct, and make it a disciplinary offense to 
engage in unprofessional conduct).  
 215. When one commentator suggested removing the term “zeal” from the rules, 
Professor William Hodes responded that this would be a “linguistic ploy” and argued that 
such a move would be no more effective than attempting “to reduce the number of serious 
crimes in society by redesignating all felonies as misdemeanors.” W. William Hodes, We
Need More Zealousness, Not Less—But Within the Bounds of Law, RES GESTAE, Mar. 2001, 
at 46, 46. 
 216. See Bernstein, supra note 19, at 1178 (arguing that a zealous advocacy does not 
require the President’s attorney to write a memo that would support the torture of enemy 
combatants, but that a true zealous advocate might take any number of courses including 
providing unwelcome advice); Stevens, supra note 14, at 27-28 (Arguing that zeal has two 
elements: “First, there must be partisanship . . . . Second, there must be a degree of 
independence, which allows for dispassionate judgment to prevent losing sight of legal and 
ethical boundaries as well as the risks of contemplated actions.”).  
 217. Bernstein, supra note 19, at 1172 (“But zeal is not the culprit in these misdeeds. 
As fiduciary, the lawyer has a duty not to enrich herself at her client’s expense. [Attorney 
conduct] may look zealous but is really just unethical if [it] hurts her client while making 
her richer.”). 
 218. Zacharias, Lying, supra note 66, at 505-06 (“If a lawyer’s ethic of zeal requires 
‘entire devotion to the client’—meaning that all considerations must give way before this 
‘entire devotion’—then the lawyer does not need to balance, accommodate, or choose among 
competing values. Nor does the lawyer need to contextualize; he can follow the same 
exclusive principle in giving advice, negotiating, and engaging in cooperative transactions.
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and implement: if in doubt, do whatever the client asks unless the 
course is clearly prohibited by law. Embracing a more thoughtful, 
less easily accessible and understandable approach, may be a chal-
lenge for lawyers.  
 Adopting professional conduct rules that flesh out the lawyer’s 
fiduciary duties would be critical to practitioners developing a com-
mon understanding of the new touchstone and replacing the zealous 
advocacy mantra.219 The profession’s governing rules should explain 
what it means to be a fiduciary. This explanation should be conveyed 
in broad rules that describe fiduciary duty generally and in narrow 
rules that explain how lawyers should act to uphold their fiduciary 
duties when advising clients. My proposed revisions are addressed in 
the next Part.220
 Another challenge may arise because of the differing views on 
when lawyers can be sued for breach of fiduciary duty. Some jurisdic-
tions do not allow a “breach of fiduciary duty” cause of action for un-
intentional attorney misconduct,221 while others do.222 Experts in this 
area of the law do not agree on when the cause of action for breach of 
fiduciary duty should be available.223 Adopting fiduciary duty as a 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
The lawyer’s life is not that simple, however, and the legal ethics standards, including 
judicial regulation, have never treated it as simple.” (emphasis added)).  
 219. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (arguing that educating lawyers 
through professional conduct rules may contribute to changing the zealous advocacy bias).  
 220. See infra Part V.  
221. See, e.g., Klemme v. Best, 941 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (holding that 
in order to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against a lawyer, plaintiff must assert 
that no other recognized tort encompasses the facts alleged); Murphy v. Gruber, 241 
S.W.3d 689, 693 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (“Texas courts do not allow plaintiffs to convert what 
are really negligence claims into claims for . . . breach of fiduciary duty . . . .”).  
 222. See Charles W. Wolfram, A Cautionary Tale: Fiduciary Breach as Legal 
Malpractice, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 689, 690 (2006) (asserting that the majority of 
jurisdictions and the Restatement contemplate two paths to liability for a lawyer’s 
nonintentional act: professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty). It should be 
noted that the Restatement allows a claim for breach of fiduciary duty only if the alleged 
conduct includes a conflict of interest, breach of confidentiality, or a situation in which the 
lawyer took undue advantage of the client. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 49 (2000) (describing a breach of fiduciary duty claim and stating that the 
breach must be of a duty listed in § 16(3)). While such breaches could be nonintentional, in 
most situations the conduct encompassed in § 49 would be intentional misconduct. 
Accordingly, I would assert that under the Restatement ordinary negligence usually cannot 
give rise to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. See also supra note 193 (text of cited 
Restatement provisions).  
 223. See Roy Ryden Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Fiduciary Duty, Tort and 
Contract: A Primer on the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 SMU L. REV. 235, 249-50 (1994) 
(distinguishing breach of fiduciary duty from professional negligence by asserting that 
negligence is based on breach of the standard of care while breach of fiduciary duty is 
based on breach of the standard of conduct); Benjamin P. Cooper, The Lawyer’s Duty to 
Inform His Client of His Own Malpractice, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 174, 209-10 (2009) (asserting 
that plaintiffs, courts, and commentators frequently lump claims for professional 
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty into the category of “legal malpractice,” but that it 
may be best to conceptualize two separate causes of action: breach of fiduciary duty 
reserved for breaches of the duty of loyalty and professional negligence for breaches of the 
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mantra may thus raise various concerns. Some may be concerned 
that attorneys would define fiduciary duty differently from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction. Others may fear that adopting the mantra would 
expand attorney liability—if the professional conduct rules describe 
the duty of care as a fiduciary duty, then courts will allow clients to 
sue for breach of fiduciary duty even when the attorney acted only 
negligently.224 Still others may be worried that if attorney conduct 
rules are drafted with the explicit goal of describing a lawyer’s fidu-
ciary duty, it will be difficult for courts to deny a civil cause of action 
based on violation of those attorney conduct rules.225
 These concerns should not derail an effort to reframe an attorney’s 
professional obligations. Even those who advocate a narrow cause of 
action for breach of fiduciary duty agree that the label “fiduciary du-
ty” is a useful way for lawyers to conceptualize duties to the client.226
Adoption of a broad definition of fiduciary duty in professional con-
duct rules does not mandate a change in the substantive law of juris-
dictions with a narrow fiduciary duty cause of action.227 Further, even 
if courts were to take a broader view of an advisor’s duty of care be-
cause of a change in the professional conduct rules, the defenses to 
such cause of action—such as the doctrine of in pari delicto—would 
still be applicable.228 Finally, professional conduct rules and other 
sources of law explicitly provide that there is not a cause of action for 
violating a professional conduct rule.229 Change in this area of the law 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
duty of care); Meredith J. Duncan, Legal Malpractice by Any Other Name: Why a Breach of 
Fiduciary Duty Claim Does Not Smell as Sweet, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1137, 1140 (1999) 
(arguing that attorneys generally should not be liable for breach of fiduciary duty unless 
the attorney commits a criminal offense, commits fraud on the client, or causes actual 
harm to the client through breach of fiduciary duty); see also Wolfram, supra note 222, at 
692 (asserting that “most fiduciary breach claims are problematic precisely because of their 
almost complete and useless overlap with available claims of negligence”).  
 224. See Wolfram, supra note 222, at 729-30 (arguing that if negligence is called 
“fiduciary duty” it may be easier to prove the claim because of broad, ethical-sounding 
language that has been used by courts to describe the duties of a fiduciary).  
 225. Professor Bruce Green explains that courts decline to equate a disciplinary violation 
with a breach of a lawyer’s fiduciary duty because attorney conduct rules were not intended 
to be strongly enforced at the margins, thus disciplinary violations are not necessarily 
violations of the duty of care. See Green, Criminal Regulation, supra note 30, at 337.  
 226. Wolfram, supra note 222, at 693 (noting that nothing in his proposed reworking of 
fiduciary breach doctrine should detract from the “heuristic value” of the term fiduciary 
and urging “that the theory of lawyer-as-fiduciary be generally recognized as a key way of 
describing the entire lawyer-client relationship and the duties that flow from it, even if it 
would not be relied upon regularly as the standard by which to measure lawyers’ liability”).  
 227. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 20 (2009) (no cause of action for 
violation of a professional conduct rule); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 52(2) (2000) (same). Whether the cause of action should be narrow is a question 
that should be examined more fully by courts, the Bar, and the academy.  
 228. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. Whether such defenses should be 
applicable is another issue that should be examined more fully by courts, the Bar, and  
the academy.  
 229. See supra note 227.  
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certainly should be considered and debated in light of issues raised in 
this Article and other pertinent factors, but does not naturally follow 
from a revision of the professional conduct rules.  
V.   A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR INCORPORATING A FIDUCIARY DUTY-
FOCUSED VISION OF ADVISING INTO PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULES
 This Part suggests specific amendments to the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct that would emphasize fiduciary duty as the gov-
erning guidepost for attorneys. In my proposal, fiduciary duty is in-
troduced in two ways. First, it is explained in the preamble of the 
Model Rules as a touchstone for all lawyers and as a gap filler when 
other rules do not provide guidance. Second, it is the basis of the di-
rection provided in several proposed rules applicable to the lawyer-
advisor. Those rules do not explicitly reference fiduciary duty, but 
they provide specific guidance regarding: (1) how a fiduciary should 
advise a client about liability-creating conduct and (2) how an organ-
ization’s attorney should protect the organization from liability-
creating conduct.  
 Also consistent with fiduciary duty, my proposed rules introduce 
lawyers to a new approach to the law (or “the bounds of the law”). My 
revised preamble and professional conduct rules describe the lawyer’s 
role as serving the client by explaining when conduct may result in 
legal liability. This approach is consistent with fiduciary duty and it 
appeals to lawyers’ natural instincts to act loyally to—rather than 
antagonistically to—the client.230 The selection of the phrase legal 
liability over narrower terms (such as “law” in the current Model 
Rule 2.1 or “violation of law” in current Model Rule 1.13) also re-
sponds to the technical-compliance focus of some lawyers.231 Profes-
sionalizing lawyers to believe it is their role to educate clients about 
possible liability could result in a real change in the way lawyers ap-
proach their representations.232
 Finally, the proposed rules are aimed at clarifying terminology 
and rule structure so that lawyers will not be tempted to fall back on 
zealous advocacy in their interpretations of the rules.233 I look at the 
intent behind complex rules like Model Rule 1.13 and attempt to re-
state that intent in terms that are more readily understood and in a 
reorganized format that is more accessible. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 230. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. 
 231. See supra notes 38-46, 183 and accompanying text.  
 232. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.  
 233. See supra notes 176-85 and accompanying text (explaining zealous advocacy and 
the current Model Rule 1.13).  
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A.   Preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Fiduciary 
Duty as Touchstone 
 The preamble should introduce all attorneys (litigators and nonlit-
igators alike) to fiduciary duty as a framework for fulfilling their pro-
fessional obligations. Irrespective of my proposal, attorneys are fidu-
ciaries. As such, it is surprising that fiduciary duty is not referenced 
in the current preamble (and is currently mentioned elsewhere only 
in the comments to the rule governing safekeeping client property).234
I propose that the preamble should be revised first to define fiduciary 
duty and then to explain its usefulness as a touchstone and guide for 
lawyers.  
 Addressing the need for a definition, Proposed Preamble Paragraph 
2A would explain that lawyers are fiduciaries and provide a basic out-
line of fiduciary duties.235 The paragraph would describe the duty of 
care as requiring “the lawyer to act as a diligent, competent attorney 
would under the circumstances” and the duty of loyalty as requiring 
“the lawyer [to] act in the interest of the client, except when these 
Rules or other sources of law permit or require otherwise.”236
 Currently Preamble Paragraph 9 addresses zealous advocacy as a 
gap filler. The paragraph provides that the lawyer should resolve dif-
ficult issues of professional discretion by relying on other principles, 
including “the lawyer’s obligation zealously to protect and pursue a 
client’s legitimate interests, within the bounds of the law” while act-
ing civilly and professionally.237 My revision to this paragraph  
provides:  
When these Rules and other sources of law do not provide ade-
quate direction or leave matters to lawyers’ discretion, lawyers 
should be guided by the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care owed to 
their clients. These duties are consistent with counsel acting in a 
professional, courteous, and civil manner toward others.238
Removing references to “zeal” in this paragraph does not undercut 
the use of “zealous advocacy” elsewhere in the preamble to describe 
the litigator’s role.  
 Finally, the current Preamble Paragraph 2 describes the various 
roles that lawyers play. Here, the litigator is described as a zealous 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 234. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2009); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.15 cmt. 1 (2009) (“A lawyer should hold property of others with the care 
required of a professional fiduciary.”).   
 235. Infra Appendix A, Proposed Amendments to Preamble to the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct: A Lawyer’s Responsibilities ¶ 2a [hereinafter Appendix A].  
 236. Id. This definition could also be added to the Terminology section of the Model 
Rules. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0 (2009). 
 237. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 9. 
 238. Infra Appendix A ¶ 9.  
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advocate.239 That language would remain unchanged in my pro-
posal.240 The advisor’s duties are addressed next. This sentence could 
be revised to introduce the obligation of advisors to explain the prospect 
of liability. I would revise the sentence that currently reads: “As advisor, 
a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the client’s 
legal rights and obligations and explains their practical implications”241
to add the following phrase, “including the risk that the client’s contem-
plated conduct may result in liability for the client.”242
 With this context provided in the preamble, the rules would dis-
cuss the specifics of exercising fiduciary duties in the interest of  
the client.  
B.   Model Rule 1.13, Organization as Client 
 As discussed in Part IV, Model Rule 1.13 as currently written is 
intended to guide attorneys in fulfilling fiduciary duties to organiza-
tional clients. One of its shortcomings, though, is its complexity in 
the number of topics covered.243 Currently, Model Rule 1.13 covers: 
(a) client identity: the client is the organization and not its constitu-
ents; (b) up the ladder reporting of constituent misconduct; (c) loyal 
disclosure of confidences to protect the organization from constituent 
misconduct when up the ladder reporting fails; (d) the inapplicability 
of the loyal disclosure rule in an investigation or in litigation; (e) at-
torney discharge for conduct required or permitted by the rule; (f) the 
need for company constituents to be informed of client identity; and 
(g) the lawyer’s ability to represent the organization and its constitu-
ents to the extent doing so does not create a conflict.244
 It is apparent that the rule covers two broad topics. The first topic 
is client identity. In sections (a), (f), and (g), the rule explains that 
the attorney represents the organization and not the constituents, 
except when a dual representation is specifically contemplated and 
does not create a conflict. The second topic is the steps an attorney 
should take to address constituent conduct that may create liability 
for the organization. This topic is addressed in sections (b), (c), (d), 
and (e).  
 The first subject has general application to all attorneys (litigators 
and nonlitigators) and should remain in Model Rule 1.13. The result 
would be a shorter rule that explains the issues of organizational cli-
ent identity in three subsections. My proposed revision of Model Rule 
1.13, dealing only with client identity issues applicable to all attor-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 239. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 2.  
 240. Infra Appendix A ¶ 2. 
 241. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 2.  
 242. Infra Appendix A ¶ 2.  
 243. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 244. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a)-(g) (2009).  
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neys, can be found at Appendix B to this Article.245 The second sub-
ject has a specific application to lawyer-advisors and should thus be 
moved to Article 2 of the Model Rules (the “Counselor” rules)  
discussed below.  
C.   Counselor Model Rules 
 Appendix C reflects how the “Counselor Rules” (currently Model 
Rules 2.1 through 2.4) could be reconfigured and rewritten to explain 
how an advisor should fulfill fiduciary duties to the client. This or-
ganization is more sensible than the current configuration, because it 
puts all of the advisor rules in one location.246 This Part discusses re-
visions to Model Rule 2.1 and the proposed addition of Model Rule 2.2 
(a revision of the current Model Rule 1.13(b)), Model Rule 2.3 (a revi-
sion of the current Model Rule 1.13(c) and (d)), and Model Rule 2.4 (a 
revision of the current Model Rule 1.13(e)).247
1.   Proposed Model Rule 2.1, Advisor 
 Currently, Model Rule 2.1 briefly states a single mandate: “[A] 
lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render 
candid advice.”248 The rule does not suggest the aim of the advice. It 
only provides that the lawyer need not limit the advice to the law, 
but may also discuss “moral, economic, social, [or] political factors.”249
 The rule should be replaced with language that better describes 
the attorney-advisor’s obligation to competently advise clients about 
the prospect of liability. I propose the following:  
Lawyers should provide candid advice that will allow clients to 
make educated, fully informed decisions. A lawyer should advise a 
client not only about how the client’s objectives can be achieved, 
but also if the client’s contemplated conduct may create the risk of 
legal liability for the client. The lawyer should provide the client 
with a full understanding of applicable sources of law (not only 
statutes, rules, and regulations, but also case law) that may be the 
basis of legal liability. Further, it is the lawyer’s province to dis-
cuss issues of intent, good faith, and morality, particularly when 
such issues may have a bearing on legal liability, such as in the 
areas of crime, fraud, and fiduciary duty.250
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 245. See infra Appendix B, Proposed Amendments to Model Rule 1.13, Organization as 
Client [hereinafter Appendix B]. 
 246. See Zacharias, Images, supra note 162, at 100 (concluding that lawyer regulation 
should be “contextualized” to make explicit the rules’ conception of the lawyers’ practice or 
other “images” of the lawyer).  
 247. See infra Appendix C.  
 248. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2009).  
 249. Id. 
 250. Infra Appendix C, Proposed Amendment to Model Rule 2.1, Advisor [hereinafter 
Appendix C, Proposed R. 2.1].  
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 The chosen language is directed at clarifying how competent law-
yers advise their clients. The rule gives specific examples of bodies of 
law that should be considered by the advisor in determining the pro-
spect of legal liability. It also explains the relevancy of morality to 
legal liability. Further, the rule explicitly provides that the purpose 
of the lawyer’s advice is to educate and inform the client.  
2.   Proposed Model Rule 2.2, Up the Ladder Reporting by Advisor 
to Organizational Client 
 Having addressed the advisor’s role in general terms, the next 
rules address the additional issues involved when the lawyer repre-
sents an organizational client. This is where I would transplant sub-
sections (b) through (e) of the current Model Rule 1.13.   
 Current Model Rule 1.13(b) addresses when a lawyer should take 
concerns of constituent misconduct up the ladder to higher authori-
ties in the organization.251 As currently written, the rule is unneces-
sarily complex because it attempts to address every possible contin-
gency. The rule envisions conduct that is planned or ongoing, as well 
as conduct that is an action or a refusal to act. The rule also attempts 
to describe every possible relationship between the organization and 
the wrongdoer: he or she may be an officer, employee, or other person 
associated with the organization. The conduct in question may be a 
breach of duty to the company or misconduct that will be attributed 
to the organization. Further, section (b) contains an ambiguous 
phrase from prior versions of the rule (before up the ladder reporting 
was provided for in the text of the rule): the lawyer must act “in the 
best interest of the organization.”252 Section (b) also provides that this 
standard usually requires the lawyer to report the conduct to higher 
authorities.253 Further, the rule contains a confusing double negative 
that allows the lawyer to not report the misconduct and provides sev-
eral opportunities for lawyers to consider what they “know[]” and 
what is reasonable and “likely.” 254
 But with the understanding that it is the lawyer’s duty to protect 
the organizational client from legal liability caused by an agent’s 
conduct,255 the rule could be distilled to the following:  
If a lawyer for an organization knows that an agent of the organi-
zation is engaged in or planning conduct that may result in sub-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 251. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2009).  
 252. Id.
 253. Id.
 254. Id. (“Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best 
interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority . . 
. .” (emphasis added)).  
 255. See supra notes 200-202 and accompanying text (describing organizational 
attorneys’ fiduciary duty).  
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stantial legal liability (such as the agent’s liability to the organiza-
tion or the organization’s liability to a third party), then the lawyer 
shall advise against that conduct, including taking concerns to 
higher authorities within the organization until either: (1) correc-
tive action is taken; or (2) the lawyer has taken the issue to the 
highest authority in the organization. In deciding if agent conduct 
“may result in substantial liability,” the lawyer should assume 
that the conduct will be discovered (not that it will remain hidden) 
and that a remedy will be pursued (not that it will be ignored by 
an injured party). In fulfilling these duties, the lawyer’s goal 
should be to protect the organization from liability or other 
harm.256
 This Proposed Model Rule 2.2 removes the confusing language 
and tells lawyers to report conduct that may result in substantial lia-
bility to higher authorities in the company. The proposal also ad-
dresses a common attorney misconception about the old rule: that it 
required attorneys to weigh the possibility that the client would get 
away with the misconduct.257 To address this issue, the proposal ex-
plicitly provides that the attorney should assume the conduct will be 
discovered and that a remedy will be pursued.258 Finally, the pro-
posed language states the attorney’s goal by undertaking these steps 
is to protect the organization. This is intended to reorient lawyers 
who may be inclined to read the rule narrowly, believing that it is 
contrary to the client’s interests.259
3.   Proposed Model Rule 2.3, Loyal Disclosure of Information to 
Protect an Organizational Client from Agent’s Conduct 
 The theme of the current Model Rule 1.13(c) is loyal disclosure. 
Unlike adverse disclosure, rules that allow the lawyer to disclose cli-
ent confidences to protect a third party,260 this rule allows the lawyer 
to protect the organizational client itself. The current rule provides 
that if, despite up the ladder reporting, the highest authority does 
not address conduct that is “clearly a violation of law,” then the law-
yer may reveal information “but only if and to the extent the lawyer 
reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the 
organization.”261 Though this complex language was intended to 
guide attorneys in protecting their organizational clients from liabil-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 256. Infra Appendix C, Proposed Model Rule 2.2, Up the Ladder Reporting by Advisor 
to Organizational Client [hereinafter Appendix C, Proposed R. 2.2].  
 257. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.  
 258. See Schaefer, supra note 171, at 440-41 (explaining that it is consistent with a 
lawyer’s fiduciary duty to assume that misconduct will be revealed).  
 259. See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.  
 260. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2009).  
 261. Id. at R. 1.13(c).  
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ity when the company’s highest authority refused to address the 
problem,262 zealous advocates have resisted that interpretation.263
 I propose the following revision to address these problems:  
If, despite the lawyer’s efforts in accordance with Rule 2.2, the or-
ganization’s highest authority insists upon or fails or refuses to 
address the matter, then the lawyer should reveal information to a 
third party (such as an owner not involved in the management of 
the organization) if the lawyer reasonably believes doing so will 
protect the organization, such as by preventing the agent’s conduct 
or by limiting the extent of liability for ongoing conduct that might 
be stopped through the disclosure.264
The Proposed Model Rule 2.3 clarifies the obligations of a fiduciary. 
When the organizational client’s agents are engaged in misconduct 
that the company’s highest authority fails to address, the company 
lawyer should disclose information to a third party if doing so will 
protect the client.265 The rule addresses attorney skepticism that 
there is no one to whom information could be disclosed to protect (ra-
ther than harm) the client,266 by explicitly noting that disclosure to a 
nonmanagement owner might be an appropriate way to protect the 
client.267 The rule also responds to concerns that it would not benefit 
the entity to disclose misconduct,268 by noting that disclosure that 
prevents future misconduct benefits the client by limiting its liabil-
ity.269 The result is a rule that clarifies a lawyer’s obligation to take 
action when doing so will protect his or her organizational clients.  
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 262. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.  
 263. See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.  
 264. See infra Appendix C, Proposed Model Rule 2.3(a). The remainder of the proposed 
rule is the current Model Rule 1.13(d), which explains that the rule is not applicable to a 
nonadvising context, including in the course of an investigation and when defending a 
claim against the client. See infra Appendix C, Proposed Model Rule 2.3(b). The current 
Model Rule 1.13(e) is revised only to make reference to the provisions that are newly 
renumbered as Model Rules 2.2 and 2.3; it would become the new Model Rule 2.4. See infra 
Appendix C, Proposed Model Rule 2.4, Lawyer’s Duty to Notify Organization of Discharge 
or Withdrawal.  
 265. Even though the current Model Rule 1.13(c) provides that the lawyer “may” 
disclose, when the rule is reduced to its essence, it becomes apparent that the rule must 
require disclosure. To keep the agents’ confidences in this situation and remain silent—
when the lawyer has determined that disclosure would protect the client from substantial 
liability—would be disloyal to the true client. See supra notes 201-202 and accompanying 
text (describing the entity’s lawyer’s obligations to protect the client from  
agent misconduct).  
 266. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.  
 267. See Schaefer, supra note 171, at 461-64 (explaining that disclosure to an owner 
could serve to protect a client under Model Rule 1.13(c)).  
 268. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.  
 269. See Schaefer, supra note 171, at 436-37 (explaining that disclosure that prevents 
future misconduct is in the client’s interest).  
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VI.   CONCLUSION
 This Article opened with a quote that lawyers want direction 
about how to act, and when they do not receive it, they are guided by 
“unswerving zeal and loyalty to clients.”270 The cases considered in 
this Article reflect that in the absence of guidance, business lawyers 
are acting with zeal, but that zeal is not loyal to their clients. Zealous 
business lawyers are encouraging the liability-creating conduct they 
should be advising against. We should expect more from lawyers. Cli-
ents should expect more from their own lawyers.    
 It is time for the legal profession to articulate meaningful guid-
ance for nonlitigators. Lawyers are fiduciaries, so it is logical that 
this fiduciary obligation should be lawyers’ touchstone. Rather than 
zealously advocating every client scheme, attorneys should be guided 
by their obligations of competence and loyalty to their clients. 
 Professional conduct rules should introduce all lawyers to fiduciary 
duty as a new mantra for decisionmaking. Further, fiduciary duty 
should guide the revision of rules that govern the conduct of legal ad-
visors. This article demonstrates that a focus on fiduciary duty can 
transform rules that are currently meaningless (Model Rule 2.1) or 
overly complex and confusing (Model Rule 1.13). In their new form, my 
proposed rules give real direction to nonlitigators: Lawyers should ad-
vise business clients about the prospect of legal liability and protect 
entity clients from agents who risk substantial legal liability. My pro-
posed rules would require more than zealous advocacy, all for the ben-
efit of the business advisor’s clients.   
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 270. Gordon, Citizen Lawyer, supra note 1 and accompanying text.  
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APPENDIX A
Proposed Amendments to Preamble to the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct: A Lawyer’s Responsibilities.  
 [1] A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative 
of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having 
special responsibility for the quality of justice. 
[2] As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various func-
tions. As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed under-
standing of the client’s legal rights and obligations and explains their 
practical implications, including the risk that the client’s contemplat-
ed conduct may result in liability for the client. As advocate, a lawyer 
zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adver-
sary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to 
the client but consistent with requirements of honest dealings with 
others. As an evaluator, a lawyer acts by examining a client's legal 
affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others. 
[2A] In performing all of these functions, the lawyer should be mind-
ful of the lawyer’s obligations as a fiduciary. As a fiduciary, the law-
yer owes the client duties of care and loyalty. The duty of care re-
quires the lawyer to act as a diligent, competent attorney would un-
der the circumstances. The duty of loyalty requires the lawyer act in 
the interest of the client, except when these Rules or other sources of 
law permit or require otherwise.  
Sections [3] through [8] would remain as written.  
[9] In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities 
are encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from 
conflict between a lawyer’s responsibilities to clients, to the legal sys-
tem and to the lawyer’s own interest in remaining an ethical person 
while earning a satisfactory living. The Rules of Professional Conduct 
often prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts. Within the frame-
work of these Rules, however, many difficult issues of professional 
discretion can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the exer-
cise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic 
principles underlying the Rules. These principles include the lawyer’s 
obligation zealously to protect and pursue a client's legitimate inter-
ests, within the bounds of the law, while maintaining a professional, 
courteous and civil attitude toward all persons involved in the legal 
system. When these Rules and other sources of law do not provide 
adequate direction or leave matters to lawyers’ discretion, lawyers 
should be guided by the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care owed to 
their clients. These duties are consistent with counsel acting in a pro-
fessional, courteous, and civil manner toward others.  Sections [10]-
[13] would remain as written 
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APPENDIX B
Proposed Amendments to Model Rule 1.13, Organization as 
Client 
 (a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the 
organization acting through its duly authorized constituents. 
Text of current sections (b) through (e) has been moved (and 
then revised) within subsections of Rule 2. Remaining sec-
tions have been reorganized as shown, but text has not been 
changed. 
 (f) (b) In dealing with an organization's organization’s directors, of-
ficers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a 
lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows 
or reasonably should know that the organization’s interests are ad-
verse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing. 
(g) (c) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any 
of its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other 
constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization’s 
consent to the dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent 
shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than 
the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders. 
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APPENDIX C
Proposed Amendment to Model Rule 2.1, Advisor 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent profes-
sional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a 
lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as 
moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to 
the client’s situation. 
The lawyer should provide candid advice that will allow clients to 
make educated, fully informed decisions. A lawyer should advise a 
client not only about how the client’s objectives can be achieved, but 
also if the client’s contemplated conduct may create the risk of legal 
liability for the client. The lawyer should provide the client with a 
full understanding of applicable sources of law (not only statutes, 
rules, and regulations, but also case law) that may be the basis of le-
gal liability. Further, it is the lawyer’s province to discuss issues of 
intent, good faith, and morality, particularly when such issues may 
have a bearing on legal liability, such as in the areas of crime, fraud, 
and fiduciary duty.   
Proposed Model Rule 2.2, Up the Ladder Reporting by Advi-
sor to Organizational Client 
Rule 1.13 (b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, 
employee or other person associated with the organization is engaged 
in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the 
representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organiza-
tion, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the 
organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the 
organization, an agent of the organization is engaged in or planning 
conduct that may result in substantial legal liability (such as the 
agent’s liability to the organization or the organization’s liability to a 
third party), then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary 
in the best interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably 
believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organiza-
tion to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in 
the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances to the 
highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as deter-
mined by applicable law. advise against that conduct, including tak-
ing concerns to higher authorities within the organization until ei-
ther: (1) corrective action is taken; or (2) the lawyer has taken the 
issue to the highest authority in the organization. In deciding if agent 
conduct “may result in substantial legal liability” the lawyer should 
assume that the conduct will be discovered (not that it will remain 
hidden) and that a remedy will be pursued (not that it will be ignored 
by an injured party). In fulfilling these duties, the lawyer’s goal 
should be to protect the organization from liability or other harm.   
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Proposed Model Rule 2.3, Loyal Disclosure of Information to 
Protect an Organizational Client from Agent’s Conduct 
Rule 1.13 (c) Except as provided in paragraph (d), if (1) despite the 
lawyer’s efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest authori-
ty that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to 
address in a timely and appropriate manner an action, or a refusal to 
act, that is clearly a violation of law, and (2) the lawyer reasonably 
believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in substan-
tial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal infor-
mation relating to the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 per-
mits such disclosure, but only if and to the extent the lawyer reason-
ably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organiza-
tion. 
(a) If, despite the lawyer’s efforts in accordance with Rule 2.2, the 
organization’s highest authority insists upon or fails or refuses to ad-
dress the matter, then the lawyer should reveal information to a 
third party (such as an owner not involved in the management of the 
organization) if the lawyer reasonably believes doing so will protect 
the organization, such as by preventing the agent’s conduct or by lim-
iting the extent of liability for ongoing conduct that might be stopped 
through the disclosure.   
(b) Subsection (a) (Rule 1.13(d) Paragraph (c) shall not apply with 
respect to information relating to a lawyer’s representation of an or-
ganization to investigate an alleged violation of law, or to defend the 
organization or an officer, employee or other constituent associated 
with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged viola-
tion of law.  
Proposed Model Rule 2.4, Lawyer’s Duty to Notify Organiza-
tion of Discharge or Withdrawal 
1.13 (e) A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been 
discharged because of the lawyer’s actions taken pursuant to para-
graphs (b) or (c), Rules 2.2 or 2.3 or who withdraws under circum-
stances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either 
of those paragraphs, Rules 2.3 or 2.4 shall proceed as the lawyer rea-
sonably believes necessary to assure that the inform the organiza-
tion’s highest authority is informed of the lawyer’s discharge or with-
drawal. 
Currently, there is not a Model Rule 2.2. 
Current Model Rule 2.3 (Evaluation for Use by Third Persons) 
would be renumbered as Model Rule 2.5.  
Current Model Rule 2.4 (Lawyer Serving as Third-Party Neu-
tral) would be renumbered as Model Rule 2.6.  
